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Introduction
All of the interruptions that transcend our routines and give life meaning are
disappearing. Even the most extreme experiences become routine as life is flattened into a
progression of differing inputs humming along at the same intensity. Time grows ambiguously
faster, we cannot keep track of it even though the numbers are imprinted everywhere. We are in a
frenzy of keeping ourselves connected; any disruption presents itself as destruction. This rapid
time isn’t a sign that we’re having fun (and fun is a duty now anyway). Everything is mere
scenery to the marathon we’ve all been set upon. Phillipedies, the original marathon runner, died
upon its completion, breathing his last breath in his message to the Athenian rulers: “Joy to you,
we’ve won.” Does our race today have such an ending? Is it consummated with a message, a
purpose, or even, any joy? For the vast majority of us, no, we aren’t lucky enough for that. We
are on our personal treadmills, running until we sputter out. The pace may oscillate, but our
sensations don’t: all states of mind occur on the same plane built upon a foundation of
exhaustion. Eroticism, the pinnacle of life at an excess, is gone, and we are left on a plateau. No
longer does life at an excess interrupt this stunted flow, only bursts of twisted horrors, of the
death we fail to get rid of. The irony is that the return of death that nullifies our life is precisely
what we’ve tried to escape. By attempting to erase negativity, any stench of death, to create a
safe and sterile world, we’ve ended up desiccating life. With eroticism turning gray, devoid of
any secrecy, of any life, we are left with only death. This is not a death that we can share, if we
ever could. It is a sterile and isolated abrupt end to a straight line of movement. It is a sputtering
out that is parsed away as quickly as possible to restore proper functioning, as all the data of our
experience is today. We move on because movement is all we have.
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Sexuality is this work’s object of study because it is the pinnacle of life in all its excess. If
life at its pinnacle begins to lose this quality, then life has also grown dull, losing its life. Dead
sex means dead life. For this reason, it is a perfect microcosm of the defining qualities of today.
A look into porn and solitary sex ends up disclosing more than how we have sex with ourselves,
but how we relate to ourselves. A look at sex with others ends up speaking on how we relate to
others. And in the violence of the incel, sexual desire turn into mass death—a most extreme
symptom of society’s attempt to expunge all negativity.
***
In a darkly lit room, online. Blue light from the screen and voices, modulated. It wouldn’t
take much for an outsider to hear pain in the laughter. This camera, or voice, recording this
imaginary scene is also guilty. We all are. Not of the horrors carried out by the abstract figure of
one of the internet’s many dark undersides, ranging from extreme physical violence to
reproduction of racism, misogyny, and their own odd system of look-based classification, with its
focus on genetics which opens up the door to all the horror that comes from reducing everything
in life to the codes we inherit. No, we are as responsible for them as they are for us. They and we
all need psychoanalysis, splay out on the couch and decode ourselves, for with the coursing
tendrils of ideology we are all constantly inheriting codes... And if only one could track them
all, control the effects, etc... not now, I am beginning to enter a delirium because I am making up
an image of myself that disgusts me, no, wait, well, I have to, that is essentially the point, taking
the object one positions oneself against and no matter the levels of disdain, there is always a
level of envy, jealousy—they are taking my enjoyment, all of ours. In a sense it is true but only
in that our libidinal economy (even enjoyment is a scarce resource. Always comes at a cost) is
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pouring out onto the laboratory floor, short-circuiting (Nature’s response to overpopulation? Yes,
the mosquitos are there for overpopulation, coronavirus and all diseases, the ultimate liberal
fantasy: global warming is God punishing us for overpopulating the world, for bringing in too
much technology, of course, the little liberal indulgent points not at America but elsewhere, at
the ‘majority’ of the world, one-child policy or not) as it flows into the incel, and stops, begins to
spin around. Maybe there is a release. It won’t be through masturbation, that only increases the
velocity of rotations. We fear the outburst of the incel because it is always one of enmity—in
words or in the extreme, a car hurtling through a crowd, a gun firing. We fear these exceptional
moments that force us to question things, that force us to flee toward more control: they could
happen at any time, from within or without, this senseless death, so at some level we are always
on guard. But what cause do we point at, to find reason in this chaotic outburst of violence from
within, these mass shootings? Gun control, mental health care, never questioning the wiring that
functions oh so well aside from its occasional short-circuits, probably comes down to the law of
large numbers, it’s bound to happen... looking out past America and seeing so little of death
replicated, our epidemic of exceptions—the mental health care should be there but no need to
question our mental health, we’re not crazy, we’re being reasonable here. The incel and his
violence are only one site where our libidinal economy commits suicide, where sexuality pours
into an abyss and combusts along with innocent bystanders. And we are all innocent bystanders,
no? But this sexual self-destruction is a chain reaction, always imploding: more virgins today
than ever. Sperm count collapsing. Erectile dysfunction in youth another pandemic and the
pharmacological solution is a depressing one, mainlining viagra at the age of twenty-five in order
to fuck the supermodel in front of you, no, it is even worse... having to “use the bathroom,”
running onto the toilet and starting to watch porn, making sure the volume’s down, and furiously
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masturbating. It is achieved, time to run back out, sustain it oh fuck please sustain it, the thoughts
spurting out, consuming one’s vision and all sensation in order to uphold the fantasy and the
afterimage singed into the retina. And we do. Life goes on, as does sexuality. But it is sustained
in spite of all the eruptions that speak its death. Sexuality and death, Eros and Thanatos, have
long been connected, from de Sade to Freud to Bataille. But what if we are sustaining a life and
an eroticism that is now more dead than ever, an inhuman, zombie-like pulsion toward
movement and function at the cost of all the things that should be worthy of sustaining it? What
if, today, we are truly in too deep?
This anxious need to sustain is what I am targeting. Anxiety, dead sexuality, and enmity;
the triangle that is hurtling toward implosion/explosion today, across many fronts. And what
better figure to begin with than the incel? Our ‘liberated’ sexuality dances atop the ideological
phantom of a filled-in void. Should we be surprised when this immaterial floor fails to hold us
up?
Are there no causes for optimism? There are but they occur in disruptions. It is a paradox
to speak of many of them because they might be processed as traumas, as they are breaks in the
system of either ourselves, but through these moments, we get a glimpse at a different state of
things. We get removed from normalcy. It is easy enough now to fall into normalcy and maybe
even live an okay enough life. But what we are getting used to deserves an active response.
Many issues require large-scale responses, but what I am advocating here—not to remove the
social element, because such a disruption needs a group act—can occur at the level of the
individual, from which it can ideally spread. There is no exact prescription to be found in this
work, instead, I call for an embrace of the things in life that likely repulse us or incite fear. Such
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an internal struggle, a throwing of ourselves into disarray, is the beginning of a politics that
escapes the flattened islands we exist on today.
***
Bataille speaks of a relationship with chance antithetical to Nietzsche’s last man: only
through risk can one truly live, and such a life requires love, erotic moments of dissolution in
which one may experience Otherness to the fullest. Only such a stance affirms life and affirms
the position of the Other. This is in contrast to the narcissistic culture of today. Baudrillard argues
that life has lost its liveliness, its excessive qualities, and has thus become dead, due to its
inability to face negativity, due to its attempt to strip death of all symbolic value. Here, the same
prevails against what is different, for death is the ultimate mover in introducing difference.
Security and comfort are prioritized over pain, but this cannot be sustained, it comes at a cost.
Death always returns. Derrida’s gift of death is always given: our laws and moral relations to one
Other always come at the expense of an unlawful immorality to another Other. Today, we have
repressed this sacrifice. Derrida shows that the pain of negativity that we avoid is merely
displaced and ignored. This initial constellation opens up the door to studying concrete
phenomena.
Over the course of this work, I study the sexual phenomena of today to show the
desexualized, narcissistic state of precisely what should be life at its most excessive, to give
examples of this deadening. In porn, sexual desire grows repulsed by Otherness. Negativity
returns in guilt and dissatisfied emptiness. Pornographic want grows to become the rule of today,
it enters into the domain of sex with others and continues to dominate. Dating apps reduce sex to
choice, pure functionality. Love dies, and even sex with others grows narcissistic. Consent
culture is the policing of this logic—though I do admit its upsides, I am not promoting all types
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of risk here—it makes sex a formula to be followed, wary of dissolution of the self, which is to
be found in its overreliance on language and rigidification, which always fails to convey true
desire. Also, this language isn’t as protective as it intends to be. In sex dolls and prosthetic
sublime women, this process is physically reified: one begins to desire sex with the appearance
of Otherness, but nothing beneath it. I conclude here that sex has grown into a narcissistic,
functional act, that lacks life. Where life should be in its greatest excess, it has been flattened.
Eroticism is dead, meaning our life has been reduced to a type of dead life. As a result, in our
loveless world, we grow isolated, narcissistic, and bombarded with all the emptiness and
dissatisfaction that results from running away from the negative. In the incel, this process
becomes physically violent. They are a recent phenomenon that cannot be viewed as an arbitrary
occurrence but as a radically threatening symptom of our current society’s sexuality. The
negativity our society has avoided returns. The incel is the subject of our desexualized
dysfunction. This begs the question: what further will be done to access this beyond that no
longer can be found in sexuality?
I should here acknowledge Byung Chul-Han’s Agony of Eros, a book that shares a similar
thesis: that we are losing connection to the Other, and that as a result, love grows cold in our
narcissistic society. Such an acknowledgment begs the question: what is new here? I didn’t start
out attempting to rewrite his book with different arguments. Instead, I was eventually brought to
the same overall thesis in my initial attempt to theorize the incel. By intervening in the discourse
that declares the end of love, to which Agony of Eros belongs, my project opens the discussion
on a variety of recent shifts in sexual practice. I explore the movements and effects occurring in
the most intimate aspects of our life and the ways we are sacrificing the things that make life
worth living.
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I am taking a risk here. Even the shallowest foray into psychoanalysis shows that writing
a project about a topic like this ultimately means opening up a vulnerable side of myself. I can
only hope that I keep the slips to the minimum, that some horrifying truth about myself that I am
unaware of doesn’t reveal itself in the process of analyzing areas ranging from depraved to
simply embarrassing. Maybe our society has been infected with some weird synthesis of
libertinage and puritanism, but through the process of critiquing this, I’ve found myself also
falling into both, or at least worried it might appear that way. I’m a man talking mostly about
masculine phenomena: this male focus on the masculine isn’t something I intend to run away
from. I know that I risk making a terrible impression, risk misrepresentation at nearly every
juncture of this work. Yet, an element of personal risk seems fitting in a project that centers in
part on the risk inherent to eroticism. I would hope that writing about sexuality from this
primarily male perspective doesn’t appear overly reductive, but is understood, rather, as an
attempt to access what is distant and unfamiliar through what is close and familiar. It would be
no less a fallacy to imagine that a more comprehensive study of feminine and masculine
phenomena would result in a totalizing view of human sexuality.
I originally intended to study only incels in this work. They appeared to me as a radical
symptom of something wrong with our current time: they simply didn’t exist until the late 2000s.
The rather sudden appearance of the incel raised the question: what has happened to produce
such men, driven by sexual frustration to commit mass violence consummated by suicide? It is
easy enough to say similar violence has always happened under the guise of war and crime, but
this seems to be too easy an explanation, ignoring what is new in the incel. Similarly, it is too
easy to simply ascribe the phenomenon to the rise of frustrated racist white men in an
increasingly “progressive” time: such a view keeps the pathologies of our culture’s sexuality
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partitioned off in a logic of “Them, not Us” One work I looked at in searching for writings on
incels, “The Apocalypse Man: The Death Drive and White Masculine Victimhood,” (written by a
white man, of course) begins with a description of the white supremacist riots in Charlottesville.
This is precisely the sort of discourse I set out to avoid. Nothing is gained by playing it safe and
ascribing the vilest aspects of humanity to those from whom we feel comfortably distant. It is
ironic for a white man to so quickly distance himself from an object of study of which he is a
part. To get to the root of the problem, one has to confront an evil that is never so far away. In
fact, in the process of theorizing contemporary sexuality, my writing ended up revolving around
facing an evil that we all fear and hide from, one that not only surrounds us but that lies latent
inside us.

12

An Ethics of Risking Annihilation
A man who finds himself among others is irritated because he does not know why he is
not one of the others.
In bed next to a girl he loves, he forgets that he does not know why he is himself instead
of the body he touches.
-Georges Bataille, The Solar Anus
When you love someone, you’ve gotta trust them. There’s no other way. You’ve got to give
them the key to everything that’s yours. Otherwise, what’s the point?
-Robert DeNiro, Casino
During the first period of a man's life the greatest danger is not to take the risk.
-Soren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals
The Painful Play of Chance
If eroticism is assenting to life up to the point of death, then in our current world in which
eroticism is dying, we no longer assent to life but passively accept it as our duty. What lies in
eroticism’s place is a parody, a pornographic replica promising to fulfill the same needs, to give
us unlimited satisfactions, without any of the pain, without any of the risks. The tension of life
lessens as desire finds its ends with greater ease; ecstasy is blunted and life is stripped of its
qualities, bearing increasing resemblance to death. We sacrifice our relationships with others in
the name of security and quick pleasures, fortifying our own boundaries to remain whole and
uninfected by the dirty uncertainties of experience, unaware that we’re now stuck in this armor
we’ve built, unable to either escape or let another in. No longer confronted by Otherness, that
radical abyss, we also lose the ability to embrace the Other. With this loss of love and
communication, the ethics of our time turns to one of narcissism, of chasing fleeting pleasures
that begin to lack all sensation as we sink deeper into our homeostatic vacuum.
Faced with this mess, I propose an ethics of risk. A stance that faces chance and
uncertainty in all its negativity, and learns to love it. That is willing to risk one’s existence, to
shed one’s borders of the self, in the name of the Other, so that we may experience the pinnacle
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of communication: love, and at this intensity, find the distinction between the existence of the
self and the lover to truly reach each other. For if one cannot love, one cannot live in any sense
beyond the meaning it has acquired today, that of bare life, the perseverance of an organism to
keep on trucking in spite of all the dullness.
It is easy enough to say one embraces negativity and death, but when it comes time to get
one’s hands dirty, to transgress the sterile laws and mores of today, suddenly the task grows
harder. It becomes disgusting. Why would anyone want that? Tussles with the negative appear
purposeless, only bringing unnecessary pain. But the point just might be that acts without
function, arbitrary embraces of the purposeless and especially the painfully purposeless, are the
cure to a life too calculated. For a life overly rationalized comes at the expense of a sublime
ontological is capable of interrupting the deluge of now-unto-future to give us deeper
satisfaction. What makes life worth living doesn’t tend to follow rational principles, but instead
occurs in this domain of the arbitrary as a disruption of life’s routine. Here, life reaches an
excessive point, a peak in its oscillation. For a rational, sterile life lacks this variation, preferring
the dull hum of a straight line on a heart rate monitor. “At least it hasn’t flatlined.”
Georges Bataille is the philosopher par excellence of experiences of excess, where life is
at its fullest, and all the transgressive and erotic elements this entails. In laying down the ethics
of this project (A process that will also expose the challenges involved in putting such an ethics
to work), I look to his thinking on chance and risk featured in his semi-autobiographical work On
Nietzsche—for through this embrace of risk to the fullest degree, Bataille finds the possibility of
a communication that goes beyond the distinction of self and Other. Life is affirmed, and space is
made for deepest ethical relations to the Other. Such a communication has never been easy to
achieve, and is by no means will one get there on a day-to-day basis. But what is to be affirmed

14

are those contingent moments where one does take the risk, where chance does appear to grant
what seemed impossible, and what was once random takes on an eternal, fated, character.
The power of embracing chance, of embracing risk, is that it can get us to the impossible.
“Chance or risk essentially assumes what is impossible.”1 Through affirming chance, one opens
oneself up to a negativity that goes beyond the limits of all perceived outcomes, thus capable of
instituting the impossible. Such an affirmation is not easy, it requires an embrace of the most
painful outcomes, just as much as the most joyous. This stance of risk assumes a core erotic and
ethical character since for Bataille, intersubjectivity and love are impossible tasks, unable to be
adequately described with language. Risk, however, opens up the door for such impossibilities to
occur, allowing one to reach Bataille’s moral summit upon which the erotic can attain its full
expression. To do this requires embracing the boundless power of chance, which for Bataille
takes on the position of a higher power: “It’s said, ‘Instead of God there is the impossible—not
God.’ It should be added, ‘The impossible, which depends on the whims of chance.’” 2 Chance
sits where God once was and here, chance takes on a more powerful role, unable to be reduced to
probabilities. For chance rules over the conditions that allow for such probabilities to even be
thought. At its most extreme, chance may grant the most joyous miracles just as easily as it may
mete out the most extreme suffering. In order to risk and reach the greatest excess, one must
affirm both equally.
Chance is always present, an uncertainty ensures that every moment of our lives is a
gamble. I never know what the people around me are capable of, or at what point nature will
intervene and obliterate me. The separation between what the law considers to be ‘acts of god,’
natural events beyond human control, and the accidents of the human world, is often thought of

1
2

Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 104.
Ibid, 115.
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as being of greatly different, but at the root of things, is relatively weak. For there is little
difference between getting struck by a lightning bolt, a plummeting rock, or bitten by a rabid
animal, and being murdered by a serial killer, ravaged by a virus, or crushed in a car accident.
The violence of nature does not suddenly change form when produced within the unknown
regions of other humans: chance is always there as something we all must face. For this reason I
throw away all distinction between the terrifying ‘acts of god’ and the most horrible cruelties of
humanity, instead ascribing both to the sway of chance, able to manifest all outcomes out of the
uncertainty that saturates the fabric of the world; from our own actions to the movement of the
oceans. In this light, how one relates to chance takes on the utmost importance. It is true that we
all do take risks, acting with calculus to decide what actions are ‘worth it.’ But in our current
time, this calculus grows increasingly tepid. It is far from the risk Bataille speaks of, where one
relates to chance in such a way where even the worst outcomes are welcomed, where one
embraces the possibility of annihilation, devoid of any fear or guilt. This Bataillean risk
embraces the most extreme limits of chance, desiring even the outcomes that bring one’s deepest
suffering, in order to access the most sublime joys. When two people reach such a summit,
individuality potentially dissolves, allowing for the most intimate communication to emerge, all
occurring on a plane previously thought to be impossible.
There is a fundamental uncertainty in the Other that at the most extreme limits horrifies
me, invoking the spectre of death. I can never know exactly what this Other wants, what this
Other thinks. The image of someone I know so well could be merely a facade hiding some dark
secret, and to an extent, it is. There always are hidden darknesses, even in our closest friends and
lovers. If it appears an exaggeration to place death, even murderous desire, within this Other, it
must still be acknowledged as a possibility whose traces cannot be eliminated from our
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interactions. One easily imagines that for the majority of history—and this is to ignore the fact
that this remains a reality today—the fear of being killed by an Other was an everyday threat one
had to come to grips with, likely having to trust others in spite of this fear having a very real
basis. That we would have been able to reprogram ourselves so quickly appears unlikely. Even if
this encounter with the radical Otherness of our others doesn’t consciously invoke the threat of
death, a small fragment of death must remain. And for all our confidence, there is always the
slimmest probability death may still occur, that even those we love may one day snap. This is the
ultimate limit of the uncertainty dwelling within every other, though we are used to its form in
much less intense manifestations: “Does my lover mean it when they say they love me?” Words
will never cross this bridge and provide certainty, there will always be an unknown presence in
our Other, in which chance reigns.
The point here isn’t to advocate for paranoia, but rather to unearth the reality of the
Other’s negativity. And it would surely be a mistake to only place this on the Other, for just as
horrifying of an Other is precisely that Other which is in ourself, a region where I don’t even
know what I am capable of, and can only hope doesn’t reveal itself. One confronts this in the
willingness of people who could be our neighbors dishing out torture to the point of death in
Milgram’s experiments, and at the greatest limits, in the complacent or even active civilian
populations of nations carrying out genocides. We wonder what those surrounding us would
do—hoping none of our friends or loved ones will partake. But ultimately, we can only hope that
in such circumstances, no horrible truth within ourselves comes out.
Bataille takes this object of terror in ourselves and others and elevates it to the heart of
his ethics. It is through this uncertainty between individuals that communication may occur:
‘Communication’ cannot proceed from one full and intact individual to another. It
requires individuals whose separate existence in themselves is risked, placed at the limit
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of death and nothingness; the moral summit is the moment of risk taking, it is a being
suspended in the beyond of oneself, at the limit of nothingness.3
The first step of this ethics of risk means destroying any idea of the self as a totality. If you or I
are complete, we do not need each other. Such a conception disregards the presence of radical
uncertainty that constitutes the Other, placing us in the realm of fantasy where the movements
and speech of the Other allow us to perceive them completely, erasing the real presence of
chance. By instead embracing this uncertainty through risk, consenting to one’s annihilation, one
may communicate. In fact, annihilation itself is necessary—the moment of death and nothingness
is also a dissolution of individual borders where for an instant, through this lovely dissolution, a
unity is achieved that requires the disrupted existence of any I. It is only through such a moment
that one finds the truth of the Other, and this unity constitutes the pinnacle of an ethics of risk.
Eroticism’s relationship to this communication must be emphasized. For Bataille, “Death
means continuity of beings.”4 And this continuity, lying at the limit of nothingness, is also
constitutive of eroticism, of life at its most excessive. Both contain the dissolution of full
individuals, a melting into unity, that can only occur at the most extreme states, such as in
eroticism and death. This erotic component isn’t to reduce Bataille’s communication to two
isolated lovers against the world. Rather it is to emphasize the necessity of love being there in
order to recognize the Other, in order to carry out an ethical duty to the Other. The connection
between the extreme states of nothingness, love, and communication take us to Bataille’s ‘moral
summit,’ an impossible ethical plane that moves beyond the good and evil of one’s social
surroundings. The morals of one’s society ensure that one is just following rules, acting a certain
way out of obligation, as opposed to out of a less functional, rational, love. By embracing the
Other beyond all of this, one’s relationship takes on an infinitely heightened meaning, no longer

3

Ibid, 19.
Georges Bataille. Eroticism. (City Lights Books; San Francisco, 1986), 13.
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occurring at a level of obligation or expectation of reciprocity. The cost is that one enters into
traumatic territory, as two cannot know how they will act toward each other if all is allowed.
This movement necessarily requires love, a love strong enough to risk annihilation in the name
of another, who could just as easily betray me. This means embracing an almost boundless
vulnerability in order to affirm a chance that requires a potential outcome of extreme suffering in
order to put forth transcendent ecstasy as a potential. These existentially catastrophic stakes seem
to imply that any type of love for all, for more than the select few, would necessitate an
impossible amount of love (though we must remember this impossible always is reachable via
risk). It was for this reason that Freud took such issue with the command to ‘love thy neighbor.’
He saw this as an unreasonable command, one that was both impossible and also corroded love
of its value, cheapening such a sublime power by enforcing that it is given out indiscriminately.
As much as we hear the importance of universal love today, it isn’t usually actually carried out,
there is little love for one’s neighbor, meaning everyone in one’s community. This is due to the
fact they always contain in them a source of unknowable horror. Lacan notes that the radical
otherness of the neighbor is what caused Freud to stop short of neighborly love, that Freud’s
account of love was one that played it safe, refusing to face this potential horrifying object that
made Freud flee just as all of us do. But by doing this, by keeping love away from that which
horrifies, Lacan saw Freud close a door: “…what escapes him is perhaps the fact that precisely
because we take that path we miss the opening on to jouissance.”5 By refusing to face the
neighbor's traumatic abyss, any attempt at achieving jouissance is precluded. Often translated as
enjoyment, jouissance entails an impossible, traumatic pleasure bringing with it pain and
suffering. It holds a similar role to the erotic state we have looked at thus far, as a type of moral

5

Lacan, Jacques, and Jacques-Alain Miller. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960 : The Seminar of Jacques
Lacan, Book Vii. (Routledge Classics. London: Routledge. 2008), 186
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summit, where prohibitions are transgressed and one reaches a type of beyond. Not to mention
the word also means orgasm. It constitutes the ultimate satisfaction, one in which borders do
dissolve, and a fullness is attained. In jouissance lies Bataille’s continuous state. The jouissance
of Das Ding, Lacan’s concept for the object of abyssal horror in Otherness I have discussed so
far, is held to be impossible: it cannot be achieved. I agree, under the condition that through risk
the impossible may be reached. Discussing it, however, is impossible in the sense it is beyond
language, and past this, to achieve such a jouissance, the peak of Bataille’s erotic state, also may
be considered impossible in the sense it entails a dissolution of subjects, of ‘I’s to potentially
enjoy it: there no longer any subject to be described as experiencing it.
Loving one’s lover is easy enough, but even in them, I ask that one loves that part of their
lover they are unfamiliar with—one must love all that is negative, all that is feared and hated, in
a lover. I must love that part of my lover which is just as much Other to them as it is to me. In
order to open oneself up to jouissance, one must love that part that isn’t worthy of love, that is
even capable of producing horror. For this jouissance is the very basis of communication, a state
of ecstasy, of life lived to excess, that at its highest limits, entails a dissolution of the self, a
moment of unity that represents the absolute ethical relationship. This is by no means an I and
Other isolated from the world, but instead an impossible ideal of communication that desires
more than two. Bataille himself emphasized this: “A life is only a link in the chain. I want other
people to continue the experience begun by those before me and dedicate themselves like me and
the others before me to this—to go to the furthest reaches of the possible.”6 And this is no
hedonistic, selfish aspect, for all that Bataille’s praise of excess may sometimes be interpreted as,
it is a state of lively excess that revolts against all that strips life of its content in this world, it is
political: “Strolling with art lovers through the galleries and across the polished wooden floors in
6
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the museum of possibilities, inside of us we eventually kill off whatever isn’t grossly political,
confining it to sumptuous dated and labeled illusions.”7 The limits of the possible entail the
location in which true communication may take place, and what Bataille advocates for is
precisely such a world that sheds its fear of death, of the other’s negativity, thus allowing this to
be achieved: “To live out possibility to the utmost means many will have to change—taking it on
as something outside of them, no longer depending on any one of them.”8 So while the moral
summit shares affinities with eroticism, with the dissolution of two lovers in erotic union, it
entails an aspiration for the social, through its actualization of what is at the limit of possibility. It
is for this reason that I take sexuality as my object of study, because if the erotic begins to lose its
vitality, stemming from its inability to face negativity and the Other, then the issue we all have
on our hands holds repercussions far beyond the bedroom, as ethical relations, love for all the
neighbors, is precluded. By failing to confront the negativity that at its further limits entails
death, life itself begins to resemble death as we sink into narcissistic solitude.

Giving Death
If this risk appears to be a poetic flourish, an exaggeration in the name of inspiring vigor
and stealing us from our lethargy, then it must be shouted that there is an evilness in this risk. It
demands that one get one’s hands dirty as well as one’s soul. The impossibility of this
community that enacts a Bataillean communication owes itself to the fact it asks everyone to act
ethical. Ethics is founded upon singular action to an Other, whereas law and morals take this
ethics and attempts to make it work for a much wider arrangement of interpersonal relations. The
cost of course is that the singular relationship becomes deprioritized, and what Bataille seeks to
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enact in his community is one in which all may act ethically, upon his summit. In order to do
this, he proposes that one goes beyond good and evil and even enacts violence: promoting
immorality itself to achieve absolute duty to the Other:
All ‘communication’ participates in suicide, in crime.
Lethal horror goes with it, and disgust is its sign.
And in such a light, evil appears—as a life source!
By destroying the integrity of existence in myself and in others, I open myself to
communion—I attain a moral summit.
And the summit isn’t a submission to but a willing of evil. It is a voluntary pact
with sin, crime, and evil. A pact made with a relentless fate that requires that while some
live, others die.9
Now it begins to horrify, this ethics of radical negativity and risk. It goes to the farthest limits,
willing sin and evil, even the death of others. It appears to quickly fail: how can anyone possibly
accept such an ethic that sits in silence while suffering occurs, while others die? A submission at
least involves passivity, a certain acceptance of the way things are, which appears justifiable. But
to will this evil? How does one live with oneself? Turning to Jacques Derrida’s Gift of Death,
this pact Bataille speaks of is shown to be one we all participate in. Through his discussion of the
binding of Isaac as interpreted by Kierkegaard, he emphasizes the fact that responsibility entails
a paradox: any moral act always contains within it immorality.
He begins by discussing a two-fold secrecy in Abraham’s story. The first one is the cruel
command by God to Abraham that he must sacrifice his son. God does not provide his reasons,
the reason he asks for such a traumatic offering; the reason for Abraham having to murder his
only son is kept secret. The second secret is that at no point does Abraham disclose his duty to
anyone, whether his wife or Isaac: just as God gives him no justification for his actions, he does
not tell anyone what has been commanded of him. He remains in absolute secrecy. For both
Kierkegaard and Derrida, this entails a transgression of the ethical order, he leaves with Isaac,
9
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intent on murdering him, and his silence ensures that the blame is placed fully on him, rather
than God’s command. He is willing to carry out his action without any speech to the community,
making it take on the appearance of cold-blooded infanticide. This means taking on absolute
responsibility: no one is there to stop him, not even his wife is left to feel the horror of God’s
command. Derrida describes how entering into language would void Abraham of his singularity,
taking him into the place of the general, the very ethical plane transgressed by Abraham.
Through speech, Abraham would rid himself of his secret, the act that he must carry out for God
would gain co-conspirators just through the awareness. No longer would solely Abraham carry
the burden of his task. But by remaining silent, he remains absolutely responsible, the decision to
go on with it is solely his own.
This goes against typical philosophical reason, in which responsibility entails accounting
for one’s actions, of entering into a public discussion. The paradox here is that this entrance into
the realm of the public as entailing a voided responsibility, “Far from ensuring responsibility, the
generality of ethics incites to irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply, to account for, and
thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept.”10 It is for this reason that
Kierkegaard declares the ethical is a temptation. For if Abraham acts ethically and explains to
his community that this is not his wish but God’s, he has failed his duty. Through his silence, he
is able to transform God’s command into his own, to act in the name of the Other as if it was his
own action. This transformation allows Abraham’s duty to God to transcend the usual sense of
duty, with Derrida stating that:
absolute duty (toward God and in the singularity of faith) implies a sort of gift or sacrifice
that reaches toward a faith beyond debt or duty, duty as a form of debt. This is the
dimension that provides for ‘a gift of death’ which, beyond human responsibility, beyond
the universal concept of duty, is a response to absolute duty.11
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The lesson here is that Abraham acting out his duty to God is the constituting factor of their
transcendent relationship. It is rather the fact that he goes beyond any concept of duty, any
reason, and decides he will murder his son without any questioning of cause, reciprocity, or
obligation. It is through his willingness to transcend duty, to embrace a certain faith (or shall I
say risk) that Abraham enters into a relation with God at the level of the absolute, above all
general ethics. This gift of death, in which Abraham must murder his son, ensures that Abraham
loves his son absolutely—or else it would not be a sacrifice. Abraham is sacrificing so much
more than his son, that he is putting on the table his own love for his son, his own wife’s
love—for how could she love him after such an act?—and his reputation throughout his entire
community. His absolute love for God and all that he is willing to give up in his name is what
takes his duty to a level of the beyond, where inevitably language falls into paradox and fails to
capture the truth of his act. For at the level of the universal, in Abraham’s silence there is no
love: it is simply hateful murder. Abraham risks annihilation in himself, is able to muster up the
necessary evil to will his own son’s murder, to commit a crime, all in the name of an absolute
unknowable Other. It is here that Abraham attains Bataille’s moral summit. For the absolutely
horrifying, cruel God to which Abraham carries out the command of entails an Absolute
Otherness that is present in us all. And in the same manner, carrying out this ethical duty to the
other, in which one attains a relation to them, enacts ‘communication,’ always contains a crime,
making a pact that while some live, others die. This is precisely Derrida’s gift of death, which
exists far beyond the case of sacrificing one’s son to God. Derrida’s point is that the moral of
Abraham’s sacrifice is about morality itself: that every act of responsibility brings with it
irresponsibility: “The concepts of responsibility, of decision, or of duty, are condemned a priori
to paradox, scandal, and aporia. Paradox, scandal, and aporia are themselves nothing other than
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sacrifice, the revelation of conceptual thinking at its limit, at its death and finitude.”12 This is the
role of secrecy: taking up absolute responsibility to one Other always comes at the expense of
voiding one's responsibility to other Others. Justifying one’s actions always means sharing the
blame, and never does it take into account those who have been sacrificed in order to carry out a
supposedly ethical act. “What binds me to singularities, to this one or that one, male or female,
rather than that one or this one, remains finally unjustifiable (this is Abraham’s hypothetical
sacrifice), as unjustifiable as the infinite sacrifice I make at each moment.”13
What Bataille enacts upon his moral summit—which may be compared to the summit of
Moriah upon which Abraham raised his knife towards Isaac—is an absolute responsibility that
goes so far as to will evil and crime. The pact he makes here might horrify, it inevitably should,
but the truth of the matter is that such a pact is inherent to morality. Something and someone is
always being sacrificed. Bataille, by willing it, takes the utmost responsibility. Two individuals
achieve a unity, destroying their existences and entering into the highest level of communication,
and take full responsibility for all the horrors that have occurred as a result of their choice: that
others were not chosen in their place, and that as a result, others suffer and die. Derrida’s analysis
emphasizes the beyond, the faith necessary for such an act. It is no coincidence that Kierkegaard,
in all his discussions on faith, always emphasized the intense risk needed to approach such an
unknown. Taking up the ethics proposed here means risking to the highest degree: entering into
the pinnacle of communication with the other (inevitably an erotic act) in which one is willing to
annihilate oneself and others out of love, and to transcend the ethics of the generality to the
extent that one even wills evil: only here do lies true responsibility, in a space beyond reason or
justification.
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Instead of Kierkegaard’s ethical temptation, Bataille discusses a sexual temptation also
leading to a similar paradox of responsibility: “With temptation, if I can put it this way, we’re
crushed by twin pincers of nothingness. By not communicating, we’re annihilated into the
emptiness of an isolated life. By communicating we likewise risk being destroyed.”14 Here,
speech itself becomes not communicating, a giving up of the secret, because for Bataille,
communication is not simply speech but rather the type of transcendent exchange found in
Abraham’s relation with God. By appealing to the universal, using the medium of language to
account for oneself, there is a certain isolation that occurs, a closing up of existence as one
attempts to justify one’s actions and in futility, convey one’s life to another. To communicate is to
take up an absolute duty to the other and risk dissolution, to sacrifice one’s reputation, one’s own
life along with the lives surrounding it. Erotic temptation presses down on one just as much as
the ethical temptation does, but from the other side. There is a safety to acting in accordance with
the ethics of the generality and a supreme risk in keeping silent, holding a secret and entering
into absolute duty to another that threatens total annihilation. In this same vein, there is a safety
in resisting erotic temptation: though one is isolated and alone, one isn’t threatened with the risks
of communication, the unity between two bodies, that threatens to defile and annihilate. In a
sense, Kierkegaard’s ethical temptation represents a safe of universalism and isolating function
of language, while Bataille’s erotic temptation holds in it the risk of completely giving oneself up
to another and the annihilation inherent in this. This erotic temptation is where communication
can occur, and it is to be emphasized that holding oneself accountable, speaking in universals,
always rips one away from this. That instead, eroticism deals in the same dimension of secrecy
as emphasized in Derrida, allowing for a communication that is truly particular, occurring
between individuals that exit their isolation at the expense of risking it all.
14
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Secrecy is inherent to eroticism. Only in secrecy does eroticism take on its necessary
uncertainty, and ability to transcend reason and practicality. Eroticism requires this questioning
and lack of justification. Flirting relies on an ambiguous subtext: there is something else hidden
beneath what I am saying that I would like you to find. Bataille says that eroticism is defined by
secrecy15 and makes it known that it relies on a singularity akin to Abraham’s absolute
responsibility: “Talk about it I shall, but as something beyond our present set of experiences, as a
beyond accessible on one condition only, that we leave the world we now inhabit to shut
ourselves up in solitude.”16 This condition is that one escapes the generality, leaves behind the
world and language that fails to capture the transcendence of eroticism by attempting to speak as
a universal experience that cannot be enunciated. Eroticism, as with absolute responsibility,
necessitates that one keeps silent: “Particularly it seems to me that to reach this beyond, we must
renounce the philosophical attitude. The philosopher can speak of everything he feels. Erotic
experience will commit us to silence”17 And he continues by placing eroticism close to sanctity,
for though the relation to an absolute Other might differ from being truly religious, there is a
sacred element to communication, and at its peak, eroticism, where two individuals reach out to
the beyond. Such a link to sanctity is what allows us to bring up Abraham in a discussion of an
erotic ethics.
Bataille’s willingness of evil is an understanding and acceptance of the necessary
sacrifices made in carrying out one’s duty to the Other. It embraces all that horrifies in the Other,
and the horrific consequences of even the most ethical of acts. Here, responsibility takes on the
quality of the absolute due to the fact one chooses to be responsible for actions of the Other. One
wills in place of the Other, rather than fleeing from consequences that one didn’t intend, that
15
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occurred through carrying out the Other’s commands. In such an ethics, there is no room for the
excuse ‘I was just following orders, doing my duty.’ By remaining silent and going so far as to
will the negative consequences of one’s ethical relations, the responsibility always rests upon the
agent carrying it out. So if the criticism comes up that Bataille’s willing of evil, lack of respect
for good and evil, would lead to moral decay—that we must instead carry out our duty to the
community—then I respond that this always allows for such outs, never admitting to the true
responsibility we hold in our actions. Abiding only by the laws of one’s community precludes
any transcendent relation to the Other and means that one is always sharing the blame. It also
fails to admit to the ways that even these acts fall into immorality, resulting in some type of
hidden sacrifice.

Repressing the Gift
Though I have withheld my comments, I would hope that in reading all this, one thought
of how far we have today strayed from the logic of Derrida’s responsibility and Bataille’s
eroticism. We resist all erotic temptation and do live isolated existences. We appeal only to what
may be spoken, act only if we can justify our actions—we cannot bear true responsibility, we are
too fearful to escape the security of the general. The gift of death, if it is supposedly
acknowledged, is through the form of ‘acknowledgments,’ speech that in the process of
mentioning those that have been sacrificed ensures that one isn’t truly responsible. “I have
already acknowledged the sacrifices, what more can you want from me?” There is no true
responsibility here, no willingness to stray from what is safe. We act toward each other as if we
had the world watching. Better to play it safe, to not risk anything more than what we’re told is
okay.
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We have killed eroticism because we aren’t willing to risk annihilation, to confront and
embrace the Other. We’d much rather play it safe in the ethics of generality and keep our
boundaries up, even if it means emptiness, isolation—loss of anything close to the sacred. As a
result, our lives themselves, unwilling to confront negativity and at its greatest limit death, lose
connection with others, beginning to resemble something closer to survival. Pure biological
function at the cost of all vitality, bare life. In this same vein, we do not dare admit to the evil we
carry out, we refuse to admit that we give any gifts containing that which we cannot face: death.
We thus fall into hypocrisy as well.
This is what Baudrillard anticipated in his Symbolic Exchange and Death. He witnesses
the beginning of a society that represses death, voiding it of all symbolic value by reducing it to a
pure opposite of life. The result of this is a horrifyingly accurate vision where we no longer enter
into relationships with the Other, fearing the negativity and risk inherent in this, instead living in
a world of sameness defined by function rather than meaning:
Pursued and censured everywhere, death springs up everywhere again. No longer as
apocalyptic folklore, such as might have haunted the living imagination in certain epochs;
but voided precisely of any imaginary substance, it passes into the most banal reality, and
for us takes on the mask of the very principle of rationality that dominates our lives.
Death is when everything functions and serves something else…Man is absolutely
indexed on his function…This is the phantasm of total programming, increased
predictability and accuracy, finality not only in material things but in fulfilling desires.18
As much as we attempt to repress death, it always returns. And the way it returns is in the very
form of our lives themselves. Everything takes on a functional use, in opposition to eroticism’s
arbitrariness and purposelessness. Under the principle of rationality, chance is the enemy, a factor
resistant to hundred-percent certainties and still slowly replaced by probabilities determining the
optimal course of action. The reign of predictability and accuracy eats away at chance, and with
it risk. In fact, this combination of total programming, predictability, and finality in fulfilling
18
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desire is exactly what one sees in the power of the algorithms that carry us through social media
and most websites, eating away at all the data we leave behind in order to predict what we like
and how we’ll act, thus eventually creating the fulfillment of desire, often in objects we didn’t
intend to desire but were rather thrown upon us.
And has COVID-19 not shown that the apocalypses of our era are ones that lack any
imaginary substance? Our time of crisis was a confrontation, for the most part, not with
horrifying images, not any real death, but instead with graphs and the sterilization of response
measures. It was an apocalypse of the banal, of sitting in an infinite waiting room alone. Even the
loss of smell and taste (mine is still weakened) has the effect of killing intimacy and closeness,
making the whole world smell like a hospital: a completely neutral scent, though with the
awareness that beneath this neutrality lies death.
I’m not trying to incite some debate about the most effective response measures or
anything of that sort, but merely to point toward the way the pandemic manifested itself. Our
apocalypse was no visceral fear, but instead slow-burning boredom that restlessly wiped down
every surface so as to avoid facing death. It is inarguable, regardless of one’s stance, that the
world has grown more sterile and to a certain extent, more dead. Despite initial hopes, it doesn’t
look like a Renaissance is coming out of this one. We are left isolated, socially confused, and
more fearful than ever of defilement and taking risks. Another step has been taken in hiding
negativity and as a result, our world is increasingly defined by sameness and probabilities
seeking to beat chance, to scrub away all uncertainty. Hiding this negativity means repressing the
gift of death, failing to account for the ways that our moralities, the measures we take to maintain
our own societies, always come at the sacrifice of the Other. Our ethics today fail to account for
the very irresponsibility built into it, for we are unwilling to face this horrifying necessity. As a
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result, we avoid taking up absolute responsibility, which would mean admitting to the fact that
our morals are inherently immoral, a stance that makes little sense when admitting this would go
against our myth of sameness, of ethical acts that don’t make any such sacrifice. This world of
sameness is one in which love falters, and with it, ethics; and in this flattened territory without
the negativity of Otherness, life itself begins to resemble the death it has tried to hide. For this
reason, now as much as ever is an important time for us to question where death is and attempt to
win back any traces of life:
Death is no longer where we think it is, it is no longer biological, psychological,
metaphysical, it is no longer even murder: our societies’ true necropolises are the
computer banks or the foyers, blank spaces from which all human noise has been
expunged, glass coffins where the world’s sterilized memories are frozen.19
Eroticism sadly succumbs to this death too. These necropolises of computer banks hold all the
world’s pornography, all the dating profiles, orders for sex robots, internet articles, and literature
attempting to clean sex up. Sexuality becomes a frozen memory, and how could it not? This
writing even risks taking part in the sterilization process. Though the causality is not so easily
found, and may be beside the point, the repression of death brings with it a dead eroticism. And
how can life not also succumb when it is precisely life in its most excessive and arbitrary?
Baudrillard theorizes this unique exchange between sex and death:
Death is not the price of sexuality…nor is sexuality a simple detour on the way to death,
as in Civilization and its Discontents: they exchange their energies and excite each other.
Neither has its own specific economy: sex and death only fall under the sway of a single
economy if they are separated; once they are mixed, they pass beyond economics
altogether, into festivity and loss (eroticism according to Bataille).20
I take up Baudrillard’s thesis that death is repressed, removed of all symbolic value. The result
being that the exchange of energies between sex and death is certainly not exciting. Death is
hidden from us and thus lacks the ability to invigorate sexuality. What is left is the death of sex.
For both Bataille and Baudrillard, the close relation between sex and death occurs due to the fact
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that they both bring continuity, a state beyond the self, and a certain excess that stems beyond
life defined by function, “We can no longer differentiate between sexuality and death…both of
them signifying the boundless wastage of nature’s resources as opposed to the urge to live on
characteristic of every living creature.”21 This is the excessive nature of sexuality, a sacred realm
beyond what purpose and function, beyond life as the maintenance of the body and production.
[It is here that I praise the death drive, for the fact it operates beyond the pleasure principle,
allowing for behavior that doesn’t value the upkeep of the self, instead moving towards
disruption of life’s functional flow. This subversive force fights against a pure biologism in life,
ensuring that evolution does contain inefficiencies even in its attempts to optimize for survival.]
Now however, sex is beginning to die. The death that has been hidden resurfaces in sexuality,
that excessive zone of life, ensuring an overall movement toward dead life, in which all behavior
must have a function, and with this all, a narcissistic isolation that chases after pleasure but never
finds satisfaction. This dead sex is my object of study.
There are two currents running through this work, a diagnosis and a prescription.
The rallying cry is this ethics of risk that acknowledges the need for negativity, chance, and death
in order to communicate with others and live beyond survival. The diagnosis is the fact that
today, negativity is being cleaned up, all traces of death and chance are being sterilized. With this
comes an inability to risk, instead opting for function and optimization. In order to not fall into
passive nihilism, I invite everyone to grow open to extreme risk. In the ensuing analysis, it
becomes clear that this is being made harder to enact. In love and eroticism, where life is at its
most excessive, where one should be most willing to risk, one sees that even here, things grow
dull and life loses its luster. This flattening out of sexuality’s excess is precisely the process of
desexualization: it becomes a mundane act akin to all of our other pleasures. Erotic continuity is
21
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precluded, and this blocks off our ability to achieve intimate communication, to reach the
summit. It never was easy; moments where individuality melts away and the self and Other come
together are a disruption of life as it is usually thought, but the point here is that the risk required
to make such an attempt sees it begin to vanish as an aspiration. The summit has always been
impossible, but our society today is growing increasingly similar to Nietzsche’s last man, who
seeks only comfort and security, avoiding all risk and pain but living a fatigued and dull
existence as a result. This isn’t a question of fixing things, we are likely too far gone. To take up
risk is easy enough but it takes true, serious pushes to enact. I worry I cannot do it. Can you?
By surveying the desexualization across the board, the relationship between sex and
death is further fleshed out, through the inverted states of desexualized sex and dead lives. The
topics surveyed: porn (and its addiction), dating apps, consent culture, bodily prosthetics, sex
dolls, and incels, receive little academic analysis, and certainly not all at once. By connecting
various practices of sexual desire, one begins to get a good idea of a horrifying trajectory
sexuality is on, as it grows more and more dead, isolated—the figure of the incel, which I will
analyze at the end, is the apogee of death’s return: sexual desire in the incel transmutes into the
desire for total annihilation of self and others.
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The Pornvana Principle

"It's true," Vanya now, "look at the forms of capitalist expression. Pornographies:
pornographies of love, erotic love, Christian love, boy-and-his-dog, pornographies of
sunsets, pornographies of killing, and pornographies of deduction—ahh, that sigh when
we guess the murderer—all these novels, these films and songs they lull us with,
they're approaches, more comfortable and less so, to that Absolute Comfort." A pause
to allow Rudi a quick and sour grin. "The self-induced orgasm."
-Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow
Pleasure without Imagination
Eroticism is dying as the presence of Otherness is erased. If a narcissism threatens us
with its rejection of negativity then there is no better place to excuse the innuendo, get our hands
dirty, than with an analysis of sexuality at its most solitary: masturbation. I must be wary not to
turn my analysis into a critique against onanism, extending a long line of conservative thought
that shackles the potentially liberating experience of locating one’s pleasure in oneself, for free.
However, pleasures that appear free, to come without pain, are precisely where I am most weary.
The attempt to remove all experience of pain and risk from sexuality might not be such a utopian
project. To speak on masturbation today inevitably means discussing internet porn, but this must
first be placed into context. Both masturbation without visual stimulation and viewing
pornography appear as free pleasures, but surely there has been a development with the densely
saturated images and sound of easily accessible porn.
For the philosophers and scientists of the 18th and 19th centuries, masturbation was a
dangerous new phenomenon—it had rarely been discussed at all prior to the Enlightenment. It
was viewed as dangerous because it was thought to pervert the imagination. In Thomas
Lacquer’s Solitary Sex, a monograph of the history of masturbation, he emphasizes that this
imaginative function, as well as discussions of addiction, were almost always brought up in
writings on masturbation: “‘Men subject themselves’; they have ‘false wants’; they are ‘addicted’
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to the imagination and the habit that subjects them. The enemies and—in the past forty
years—the friends of masturbation who want to rehabilitate it agree on at least that”22 Here, the
major distinction between then and now grows quite apparent: with readily available internet
pornography, masturbation no longer relies on this imaginative component. And this is what
really is at stake here, not that erotic desire is expressed in solitude, but that with internet porn,
erotic desire mutates into something else: pornographic want. This pornification of desire is the
target of my critique: that the mutation of sexuality into pornography marks a key point in the
process of desexualization, bringing about a deadening of eroticism with massive social
repercussions.
The role of desire in masturbation, of ‘false wants,’ gains a new tone placed in our
current time. What was once a self-created false want, an imaginative act, now is received
rather than created. These imaginative creations were what invoked such fear, even Kant was
horrified by such an act:
Kant zeroed in on this: the moral insanity of masturbation, what made it worse than
suicide, was that the masturbator ‘himself creates its [desire’s] object. For in this way
the imagination brings forth an appetite contrary to nature’s purpose’ Fictions and
phantasms—the made-up, imagined, self-fashioned products of the mind—always at the
ready, were the real villains of the piece.23
This function has completely been lost. Prior to internet pornography, masturbation would allow
people to act our their fantasies and access otherwise unobtainable sexual pleasure. Imagination
here takes effort. It still contains negativity, for in the process of imagining, one is presented
with a whole host of possible interruptions to the flow of one’s thought. Anything that intrudes
can prevent completion of the act. Because of this, it may even be passionate. It doesn’t
preclude the Other, but instead attempts to bring the Other into one’s mind. The real-world fuels
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such fantasies that are acted out due to their unavailability. If earlier critics objected to the
onanist’s reliance on the imagination to conjure up the object of his desire, warning of his
“addiction to imagination,” this now is something to be praised, for it is something that our
society has lost. Placing oneself in opposition to nature’s purposes, an act that horrified Kant, is
an act that affirms life, that takes one’s pleasure into an excessive realm, fighting against a
rational principle of desire that desires only to function. However, with pornography readily at
hand where one goes, what space is there for the imaginative act? No one is addicted to
imagination. No one conjures up their own desired object. Instead, one desires what is presented
on the screen. Porn lacks all imagination because, to use Nabakov’s definition, in porn
“obscenity must be mated with banality because every kind of esthetic enjoyment has to be
entirely replaced by simple sexual stimulation."24 Imaginative masturbation contains the
potential for aesthetic enjoyment, an act of creation. In porn, creation is exchanged for the
passive reception of sexual stimulation itself—lacking in any excess, in any possible
interruption. Porn is obscene and banal stimulation, it is pure efficiency. For this reason, porn is
never described as sexy. That something so sexually stimulating could be so far from sexiness
results from its lack of any negativity. It is raw functionality, sex without any secrecy.
Porn ensures a complete lack of effort in achieving sexual pleasure, it guarantees this by
eliminating any role for the imagination. From the consumer’s perspective, it serves the
function of an almost guaranteed orgasm, usually for free. From the business’s perspective, the
orgasms of even non-paying consumers generate voluble profit flow by generating ad revenue.
The solitary act is no longer so solitary: one is in a sense working from home. If someone’s on
PornHub, money is accumulating at their headquarters in a Cyprus tax haven. There is no risk in
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this guaranteed sexual release. One doesn’t need fantasy or the real world to achieve it: the
websites will provide the fantasies for you.
If the problem was once that men subject themselves, it no longer can be said to be so
self-reflexive. The viewer now is subjected to desired objects, and with this external reliance, is
there not potential for addiction to sprout up? Not to mention the fact that the desired object,
sexual stimulation without its secrecy, its risk, is much harder to find in the real world? Early in
his career, Freud himself wrote in a letter that he viewed masturbation as the prototype for
addiction that alcohol and other narcotics only follow the model of.25 Internet porn presents the
ability to indulge effortlessly in a pleasure for which no work is required, and that can be
performed practically whenever one is alone. Imaginative masturbation might have appeared
similarly in previous times, but it still required the work of conjuring one’s desired object while
simultaneously blocking out wayward thoughts that interfered with the fantasy. With the ease of
access offered by the phones and computers, it seems quite possible that these objects
ever-present in contemporary life themselves grow associated with the gratification of sexual
urges. These objects, through which we interface with much of our social world, necessary for
both work and our free time, also become objects that arouse. This connotative power of the
device might, for some, make porn an irresistible temptation. I hesitate in discussing the
possibility of porn addiction, for it takes me into sketchy terrain where I’m bed-fellows with
conservative thinkers and others who put restrictions on sexuality. But if porn is pure sexual
stimulation, removed from the uncertainties in real-life sexuality, sheltered from its messy
Otherness, then there is a chance that what starts as the desire to relieve a sexual urge mutates
into the desire for the highly saturated sexual stimulation of pornography.
Baudrillard theorized such a future for sexuality in which it loses its excess: “Sexuality
25
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does not fade into sublimation, repression and morality, but fades much more surely into the
more sexual than sex: porn.”26 Sex always brings with it unsexy, awkward moments. It is
never pure sexual sensation, encounters in the bedroom always hold the possibility of being
intruded on by content that isn’t sexual. Same with imaginative masturbation in that it always
runs the risk of being intruded upon by thoughts of the everyday. A struggle takes place in the
efforts of the mind that raises the stakes. In our world of sameness, it makes sense that these
imperfections and uncertainties would be washed away, and with this, for sexuality to mutate
into porn desire: why not eat the whole cookie? Why not make even sexual desire into a
function of efficiency? Porn’s guarantees ensure that free of charge, consumers “get what they
bargained for”—however, the costs are not obvious. The return payment is hidden in the
repercussions of this transaction, for nothing comes without a cost, and no matter how
thoroughly negativity is eliminated, it always returns. Guilt comes into play, owing to its
relation to a sense of indebtedness: one receives a pleasure that cannot be reciprocated. The
negativity returns and ensures that one’s free pleasure is paid for in guilt, time, and libido. But,
given the easy instinctual gratification, one finds oneself willing to recurrently make this
payment. Sexuality learns to find its end not in Otherness, with its traces of uncertainty, but in
pornography. Here, sexual desire begins to take a different form. A form in which niche
fantasies are pitched relentlessly at the viewer, crowding out the space for imagination,
diverting an urge to seek out the desired Other in the world. Essentially, sexual desire learns to
desire only sexual stimulation without any excess. No strings attached.
One’s desired object becomes imparted on the subject, rather than produced. If one raises
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the point that this is how things always have been, a la Lacan’s thesis that our desire is always
the desire of the Other, then I respond that a certain change must have occurred when that Other
became a computer screen rather than a human. For there is no trace of Otherness in
pornography, none of the uncertainty. For Lacan, one never knows exactly what the Other
desires, yet attempts to follow or fulfill it through a misrecognition. This failure in recognition
isn’t to be found when desire comes from the faceless computer, only seeking to maximize its
profits with algorithms ensuring the consumer returns and watches as many ads as possible:
every desire that makes it money is its desire. Not to mention, the desire for porn is for pure
sexual stimulation without excess, inevitably creating fantasies that reflect this rather than an
eroticism that seeks something beyond. It is in this sense that Han’s idea that sexuality is being
pornified takes on its full effect. If “today, even real sex is turning into porn,”27 then this is
because the fantasies brought into the bedroom now originate in the purely positive sexual space
of pornography. No longer is imagination necessary, or any risk, instead two lovers re-enact the
scenes they’ve pleasured themselves to—with another person this time. They use each other,
without knowing it, to attain the stimulation they seek. If someone responds: “Not me, I care
about pleasuring the Other,” and believes they aren’t caught up in this narcissistic loop, the
Other’s pleasure is simply what gives them their stimulation. Again, this mechanism of desire
has likely always been in effect, there always might have been a bit of narcissism. However, the
internet’s purely positive pleasure, part of an overall movement to expunge sexuality of its
negativity, has made our sexual desire turn to efficiently pleasurable sensations that cannot have
imperfections in the same way a lover can. This pornographic want—which can even be enacted
with someone else, in the bedroom—is a dead flow of sexuality, an acrid channel through which
sexuality flows back into the subject of a narcissistic loop that means only decay. Sexuality is
27
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made devoid of its exceptional, excessive nature, instead becoming an end, just like anything
else. This is what desexulization looks like precisely: sexuality is flattened and reduced to a
status of need similar to other bodily desires: eating, drinking, working out, etc. It loses its
excess, and while desire is still carried out, the urges are still present, they now occur on the
same plane of intensity as everything else, producing an increasingly empty fulfillment. There is
nothing sexy about porn on the screen, and doubly so about the blank stare of the nearly inherent
body viewing it in a daze. Yet, one is still carrying out a sexual urge. This paradox is precisely
the process of desexualization, and the result is dead sexuality. Without this erotic summit for
life to reach toward, one that requires Otherness, we instead shift toward an isolated narcissistic
loop in which all the desires of life are just as easily fulfilled and undifferentiated.

Pornographic Control Systems

In the beginning, internet porn might have constituted a liberation. One could go beyond
a repressive environment and enter into a world that was otherwise forbidden. But as the internet
developed, algorithms improved; people realized there was more money to be made. These
freed-up desires have been dammed, forced to flow through certain channels, and now lack any
subversive ability. Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies work theorizes the creation of fascist
desire, full of digressions that at one point include a hundred-page long survey of how lack is
inserted into sexual relations, questioning why the lifting of sexual repressions throughout
history hasn’t led to a free sexual desire, instead always seeming to cause ensuing repressions,
ensuring that desire doesn’t become dangerous to the social order. In describing the logic of this
process, he puts forth a hypothetical new planet offering liberation:
What would happen today, when the average ego is considerably more ‘stable’ and
repressive apparatuses are far more intricate, if the existence of some sparsely
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populated, quasi-paradisiacal planet were confirmed? The directions for getting there
couldn’t be hidden away forever in some steel-plated safe, nor could the means for
financing the venture. In order to keep the buses rolling up with full loads to the factory
gates the system of terror would have to be stepped up sharply; new forms of
reterritorialization would be needed.28
Does the internet not present itself as this very planet? Originally removed from any government
control, it must have been a site where desire could flow beyond its formerly oppressive bounds.
However, this can no longer be said to be the case. Theweleit, writing in the 70s long before the
internet, describes the logic of reterritorialization. That which first presents itself as a liberation
always brings with it a new form of control, ensuring that desire remains invested in keeping up
the social order. If internet porn ever had a liberating effect, likely by allowing repressed
sexuality to express itself in unwelcoming environments, the reterritorialization of desire
ensures that moments of liberation end up providing the foundation for further control to be
enacted. Organization is imposed onto a zone of expression ensuring that subversive desires are
tucked away into their safest possible outlets. With a website like Pornhub receiving 33.5 billion
visits in 201829, it appears idealistic for the liberating effect of porn to be upheld. And even if
liberation is present in some form, it has brought with it new forms of control. And there is no
better way to institute internal control than through the creation of guilt. And with the
widespread self-diagnosis of porn addiction, and the large numbers of people with extreme
relationships with pornography, it appears that guilt is deeply embedded in many people’s
experience consuming porn. What makes this odd is that in our sexually liberated world, we
aren’t told to feel guilty about masturbation. No longer do moralizing forces proselytize against
indulging such urges. Yet still people feel guilty, as if they have transgressed some moral law.
The two extreme modes to be analyzed are on opposite sides of the spectrum. Those that
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masturbate incredibly compulsively, and those that abstain. The former refer to themselves as
‘Gooners’ and the latter ‘Nofappers.’ The gooners completely indulge themselves, raising porn
to a nearly sacred level and lifestyle choice. At its furthest, this means dropping out of life
completely, spending money on toys and multiple monitors, and masturbating all day without
release for week, even month long stretches, in an attempt to achieve a state they believe they
have discovered consisting of mind-numbing pleasure. Nofappers idealize complete abstinence
from masturbation, usually from the angle of believing they are addicted to porn and attempting
to cleanse themselves. This also takes on an almost religious aspect, as they view abstinence
from porn as allowing for a vulgar sublimation, capable of rehauling their lives and having
effects such as freeing them from depression, increasing their testosterone, and fixing
impotence. There is a masochistic element to both, with gooners gaining an enjoyment from
knowing they are doing something wrong, messing up their lives, and being completely helpless
in spite of all of this. This guilt over their actions provides an additional enjoyment to their
entire experience. Nofappers, on the other hand, carry a guilt that they are attempting to get rid
of through abstinence. They are also stuck in such a cycle of compulsive porn watching, and
look toward abstinence as salvation. But there also has to be a masochism in both their
successes and failures. If they succeed, their will has won over their desire. The pain they feel
from withholding their urges gives them a feeling of triumph. Their failures in the form of
‘relapses’, which for the majority of the community seems to be the constant case, gain an
elevated status precisely because they know they are doing something they shouldn’t. On their
forums, their streaks, durations without falling into their desire, will often last only a couple
days. And yet they will still continually fight against it. What happens takes on the character of
what is to be found in the novel Zeno’s Conscience, in which a man is unable to overcome his
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cigarette addiction. After many promises to smoke his ‘last cigarette,’ the protagonist’s life itself
begins to revolve around these last cigarettes, where they take on a sublime characteristic. In a
sense, the flow of his life is demarcated by a constant ‘one last time’ that always fails:
I believe the taste of a cigarette is more intense when it's your last. The others, too, have
a special taste of their own, but less intense. The last one gains flavor from the feeling of
victory over oneself and the hope of an imminent future of strength and health.30
It is quite apparent in the nofap community that this surplus of satisfaction is created in their
endeavors precisely because they are trying to quit. They are able to enjoy a victory over
their urges, as they find themselves presented with a clean slate, while simultaneously
getting the satisfaction of having given into their urges, creating the guilt from which they
seek repentance. And following Zeno, they also create a philosophy behind it:
To reduce its outlandish appearance, I even tried to give a philosophical content to the
last-cigarette disease. Striking a beautiful attitude, one says: "Never again." But what
becomes of that attitude if the promise is then kept? It’s possible to strike the attitude
only when you are obliged to renew the vow.31
The impossibility of their situation is shown in this. By elevating porn to a sublime level in
which abstinence will create a better life, they doom themselves to never being able to stop.
Even if they are able to abstain for years, and their life does improve, this is all still founded
upon masturbation. It fails to give up its hold on their life, instead simply taking on a different
relationship. Gooning marks a similar elevation of porn/masturbation to a sublime level, though
in the opposite direction. They serve as the threat that presses down on nofappers that must be
fought against through abstinence. While little has been written about gooning, save the posts
from the 235k member Reddit group self-described as a ‘bastion for bate addicted fistfuckers,’
the sole article on the subject describes gooning as “a sort of modernized version of tantric
sex/masturbation without the spiritual aspects that have been traditionally associated with it in
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the past.”32 This is the profanation of a once sacred and spiritual state. In lieu of meditation’s
transcendence, in which a separation from the ego and its desires are carried out, the gooner
accesses a state where “‘inhibitions will have completely melted away and you are at one with
your body.’ Many gooners describe it as the state where your ‘mind merges with your cock.’”33
The irony here is that the soul/mind-based transcendence of meditation is replaced by, through
digital means, an emphasis on the body.
There is a large compulsive nature to gooning, but there is not so much a threat of
addiction in the community due to the fact that this compulsive aspect is part of the enjoyment:
a helplessness felt toward one’s desire to watch porn. This helplessness is found in nofap’s
desire for abstinence and constant relapsing, but the gooners consciously turn it into an
additional source of masochistic enjoyment (the abstinence goal might also be premised on a
masochism, but it is not so overt):
What also propagates this addiction — if indeed that’s what they’re experiencing,
because repeatedly engaging in a behavior alone is not ‘addiction’ — is that a built-in
part of the gooning fetish is the idea that one can’t stop, nor should they. There’s a
submissive element to the kink where gooners are “ordered” to continue, born out
through memes of pornstars or models that say things like, ‘Pump harder’ or ‘He better
not cum.’34
There is an odd presence of masochism and asceticism in both. The abstinence of the nofapper
is an attempt to gain control of one's desires, always a painful process, and the constant
relapsing shows a masochism of premising one’s life on an impossible feat: to stop jerking off.
The asceticism of the gooner obviously isn’t there in the sense they avoid indulgence. However,
their isolation in their ‘goon caves’ [expensive set-ups of computer monitors and various toys],
their desire for a mindless trance state, and the giving up of all desire but further masturbation,
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does make for a weird secularized asceticism. For even if they are following the pleasure
principle, chasing after ‘a state of least tension,’ this contains a certain struggle in the process
through which their edging introduces tension, and in the fact they are able to enact an escape in
which all of the world but their masturbation falls away for incredibly long stretches. They are
able to disconnect from all desires except one, and this is the price of their escape: rewarding
them with ‘endless self-pleasure’ in which deeper satisfaction is always elusive.
Both groups run off of a certain relationship to guilt. There is the helplessness felt toward
the urge to watch porn (imaginative masturbation wouldn’t create either of these groups, and
neither of them contain people who don’t watch porn but still masturbate), and the guilt this
brings is either embraced as a source of masochistic enjoyment for the gooner, or fled from in
the abstinence of the nofapper (though again, there is a masochistic enjoyment precisely in both
this abstinence and its vicissitudes). Looking at these two extremes might not necessarily
explain the truth in the middle, as they seem to fundamentally face the same urge and relate to it
differently, but the very function of their extreme approaches do show the intense guilt encoded
into pornography. This likely does occur at lower intensities in a decent majority between the
two: they feel guilty for the only reason Lacan says we ever feel guilty, they have given ground
to their desire. If it appears that there is a contradiction in the use of the word ‘desire,’ then note
that for Lacan here, it is a much deeper, unconscious truth of one’s destiny and path in life, a
more fundamental lack of being we strive to fill throughout our lives. This is in contrast to our
use of the words pornographic want or sexual desire, which are a more specific, multi-faceted,
filling in of this fundamental lack, that are failed attempts and even in contrast to enacting
Lacan’s notion of desire.
In psychoanalysis, guilt is traditionally thought of as occurring under the domain of the
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superego, the agency within us that acts as our moral conscience, scolding us constantly for our
actions and even thoughts that transgress moral law. However, for Lacan, the superego does not
act as this moral force, but as that which commands us to enjoy! Obeying its command gives it
increasing power, leading us to enjoy further and further. In the current case, this means more
and more masturbation. So where does the guilt come in if not from a moral agency within us?
And why feel guilty about something that isn’t necessarily moral law, for today, masturbation
and viewing porn is considered normal and natural to do? Lacan’s answer is that the guilt does
not arise from breaking these rules, but from a betrayal of our desire. The superego isn’t the
force that punishes us for the transgression of moral law, but instead commands us to enjoy
rather than act on our desire. Abiding this command inevitably creates guilt because we have
given into enjoyment at the expense of what we truly desire. So the compulsive masturbator,
heeding the superego’s command to enjoy, gives ground to desire, and thus finds a well of guilt
alongside enjoyment. Pornography, especially at the highest intensities, is thought to offer access
to enjoyment, or jouissance, that leads one to stray from what one actually wants. In the gooner,
a masochistic twist enables an escape from confronting the fact they are not following what they
desire, instead caught up endlessly circling around the elusive full satisfaction of jouissance, and
the guilt that is produced becomes an additional source of pleasure. In the nofapper, there is a
recognition that they don’t actually desire pornography, and intend to move beyond it. However,
the way they construct their identity around abstaining from their source of enjoyment ensures
that they can never get away from it. If they fail, which most do, then they once again have
fallen under the sway of the superego’s command, and they are rewarded with a masochistic
enjoyment of this failure: it was always going to happen. If they succeed, they still likely betray
their desire. Why? Because their desire is structured around a prohibited object. Every act is
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stained by the fact that they haven’t overcome the urge to watch porn. Never can they freely
carry out their desire, for there will always be the obstacle of porn preventing it. Abstinence
from porn takes on the flack for nearly all of their inability to live the life they want to. They fail
to realize that their sense of dissatisfaction and guilt is a sign for them to discover their desire,
rather than simply a sign that quitting porn will take them there. Porn is used to hide the fact that
the true object of their desire is impossible, and it is precisely through confronting the negativity
of this object that one can embrace Otherness. With an absolute willingness toward risk and all
that negativity entails, such an impossible desire may be granted for Bataille, and this is the very
stuff of eroticism, in which one reaches the peak of an ethical relationship.
For both extremes, porn becomes a guilt-creating machine. But a look into their
specific logic doesn’t so easily allow claims to be made about porn itself. However, it begins to
point to something that seems to be inherent in pornographic want: sexuality without any
negativity. Pure stimulation. Fulfilling desire appears to require negativity. As alluded to
earlier, porn is a gift that one finds no way to reciprocate. There is no pain, no other to respond
and ask for anything, and no exertion other than time is spent on it. Inevitably, the negativity
reappears. So at a less extreme level, the function of porn promotes this superego injunction to
enjoy, and creates a need in its viewers that if they fold to, brings guilt. In this process, sexual
desire becomes pornographic want: it learns what it wants, and what it wants is no exchange,
but a narcissistic loop that ends in guilt. It begins to preclude the erotic relationship. One
always pays for their enjoyment, and with porn, a new form of sexuality is uptaken that cannot
be shed.
Nietzsche discusses the relation between guilt and debt in Genealogy of Morals. The
German word Schuld means both guilt and debt. Nietzsche’s argument is that guilt doesn’t
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originate from moral transgression, but as a debt that was owed, a punishment as a means of
securing payment. It seems like the appearance of guilt from watching pornography would have
to arise out of the fact it is ostensibly free pleasure. One is able to exact an orgasm without the
slightest amount of work, for the imagination is dead and the body is mostly inert. This
inevitably creates a feeling of indebtedness to which no payment can be directed. Only after the
fact of this debt does a moralizing force get introduced. Porn and masturbation come to be
viewed as wrong not because of any moral precepts against it, but because the feeling of guilt is
associated with morals. One learns to view their porn watching as something morally wrong
resulting in a sense of debt. Simultaneously, the superego commands them to continue watching,
to continue to enjoy themselves, even if it comes at the expense of massive amounts of time,
even if it means giving way to their desire. An indebtedness to the faceless screen and a betrayal
of one’s deeper desire creates a sensation of guilt that is associated with morals, and pain grows
out of a pleasure that should ostensibly be easy and pain-free. But this pain doesn’t prevent
anything, in fact, one doubles down, listens to the superego further and further. One grows stuck
following an empty easy pleasure in spite of the fact that it comes to bring inordinate amounts of
guilt and pain. The subject grows docile, helpless, and believes themself to be transgressing a
moral law, in spite of no one ever saying that it’s bad.
So if this is viewed as a critique of porn use, it isn’t so stark as saying no one should
watch it. Instead, it is that we should be wary of that which leads us astray from our desire. Guilt
about porn doesn’t result from the transgression of some moral prohibition, but the fact that it
isn’t actually what is desired. When it reaches compulsive use, it is simply an easy route to avoid
carrying out what we would like, following the same logic found in William Burroughs’s
statement that “you become a narcotics addict because you do not have strong motivations in any

48

other direction.”35 This isn’t a matter of diagnosing chemical or behavior anomalies, but rather
certain urges and needs that find their gratification easily today, lacking any confrontation with
Otherness. The difference with porn is that this affects one’s sexuality, and moves toward an
elimination of Otherness in that sphere, which as I have said, constitutes an excess of life. The
reduction of sexuality into this easily gratified need flattens the vitality of it, putting it on a
similar plane to other urges. This elimination of Otherness, which always brings with it
narcissism, and the ensuing loss of vitality, characterizes the process of desexualization. In porn
and pornification, eroticism dies, becoming instead a functional operation of deriving a specific
type of stimulation and pleasure. Sexuality loses its position as an affirmation of life and as any
access to the beyond, for it doesn’t embrace any negativity, it lacks any play of chance or
uncertainty. Without an Other, no communication can occur, and importantly, porn begins to
prevent the possibility of ideal communication precisely because it dulls down the erotic
moment. It removes the position of the Other in sexual desire, and this carries over to sexuality
expressed in the physical presence of another. Sex with others turns into a narcissistic fulfillment
of a more base urge, losing its excess and arbitrariness. It becomes the play of two closed off
selves, with no opportunity for dissolution and the continuity of selves seen in Bataille’s
eroticism.

The Play of Thanatos
But I would be remiss to move on so quickly, and not, for a moment, return to gooning:
for does its secularized tantric goal not contest my claim? The trance state achieved does imply a
dissolution of the self, and their lifestyle seems to offer a potentially subversive effect, in that
35
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they decide to remove themselves from society and endlessly indulge in their own pleasure..
Importantly, looking at gooning offers us an entry point to lay down a discussion of the death
drive or Thanatos, which certainly deserves mention in a work on sexuality and death. The death
drive has two different functions that both appear at first to relate to the gooners: In Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, it is described as ‘a return to a prior state of things’ as well as being
responsible for a compulsion-to-repeat, especially that which is unpleasant. Certain thinkers
emphasize the death drive’s potentially subversive and liberating effects. I take this up as well,
but attempt to navigate around the many dilemmas that often appear in these discussions. For this
is contradictory territory: one needs death to confront negativity and embrace Otherness, but
death’s presence in life is said to be cause for alarm. Where should the death drive be located
here, and can it possibly be found in the wrong place: should I worry that I have praised a force
that in doing so, justifies the unjustifiable?
I begin with Herbert Marcuse’s Nirvana principle, which is his latching on to the aspect
of Freud’s death drive that wants to return to a prior state of things, to inorganic matter. Again,
the masturbatory tantrism of the gooner seems to aim at this, a reduction of tension, avoiding the
vicissitudes of life to instead live an inert, low tension existence. It is here that I turn against the
utopian marriage of Eros and Thanatos put forth by Marcuse in his Eros and Civilization. I ask:
is this really the death drive? Is this a utopia?
The death instinct operates under the Nirvana principle: it tends toward that state of
"constant gratification" where no tension is felt -- a state without want. This trend of the
instinct implies that its destructive manifestations would be minimized as it approached
such a state. If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination of life but of pain -- the
absence of tension -- then paradoxically, in terms of the instinct, the conflict between life
and death is the more reduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification.
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Pleasure principle and Nirvana principle then converge…The "conservative nature" of
the instincts would come to rest in a fulfilled present.36
Today, we know that the reduction of such a conflict is no liberation, for it is our reality, and the
fulfilled present is nowhere to be found. In gooning, constant gratification and the termination of
pain in a state of low tension doesn’t mean liberation, but does mark an end to the conflict
between life and death. Unfortunately, the conflict ends because death has won. It is easy enough
to see how the convergence of the two might appear liberating: life becomes a state of constant
gratification, a Buddhist utopia where we have escaped desire as a source of struggle. Even if
want remains today, all the other criteria are fulfilled. And how could a state of gratification ever
exist without want? A want would need to be there, being satisfied. What fails in Marcuse is how
the death drive comes into play. On a theoretical basis, one also cannot accept the death drive as
this lowering of tension. For what Marcuse misses is that the pleasure principle and death drive
are here identical: the pleasure principle is also the principle in the organism toward lower
excitation. If both are already the same, then any conflict to begin with wouldn’t exist. If the
death drive is for the organism to die its own internal way, is the death drive not a perseverance
in the face of tension? The easiest release would simply be to die in whatever way was offered, a
death drive towards lower tension simply folds here. Not to mention there is a massive
incommensurability between destruction and a drive toward a state without tension. For this
reason, if I am to praise the death drive, to give it any subversive edge, it would have to be
because it increases tension, truly going beyond the pleasure principle. For in a world without
tension, as described by Marcuse, connections with others suffer or outright disappear: there is
nothing in them for one to want. Life becomes a hedonistic blur of a fulfilled present at the
expense of any future.
36
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In Alenka Zupancic’s work What is Sex? The productive effect of the death drive is
discussed. This is a death drive that increases tension, which can also be viewed as an
introduction of difference. As Lacan uses it, the death drive is a “Will to make a fresh start. Will
for an Other-thing.”37and for her;
We could say: the death drive is what makes it possible for us to die differently. And
perhaps in the end this is what matters, and what breaks out from the fatigue of life: not
the capacity to live forever, but the capacity to die differently. We could even paraphrase
the famous Beckettian line and formulate the motto of the death drive as follows: Die
again, die better!38
In this sense, an embrace of the death drive aligns with the ethics of risk I extract from Bataille.
One praises negativity for the introduction of difference it brings to the table. It breaks from the
fatigue of life—and surely life is growing more fatigued, more routine. There is nothing
liberating about immortality. The elimination of death comes at the expense of life. Just look at
Turritopsis dohrnii, the immortal jellyfish. Without external interference, it lives forever by
constantly returning to a presexual state: back to childhood. This is the domain of death drive as
a return to a prior state of things at its finest: upon exposure to any stress, assault, old age or
disease, it goes back to the beginning. In order to achieve biological immortality, it is always on
the run, away from anything that hints of death. Life is prolonged indefinitely but the expense is
that even the slightest oscillation in life causes it to flee, to return to an immature state where it
may be safe. Such a state is horrifying, for with death and negativity come all of real life’s
excesses. Dying again, dying better is a rallying cry for a cathartic finish to a good life.
Immortality is antithetical to this: it inevitably is an oscillation where all extremes are lost in a
sea of endless time, and thus lose all access to excess, to breaking out of the routine. As
horrifying as the immortal jellyfish might be, what could be more pathetic than its eventual death
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in the ocean: all the worry it has spent attempting to prolong things, the constant fleeing, didn’t
pay off. It dies having never lived, for life was defined by continuing and nothing else. The death
drive is the force that interrupts this, that refuses organization, refuses sameness, and attempts to
introduce difference. Along these lines, it is through the death drive that routine is interrupted,
and thus access to a beyond state is presented: “What can eventually shift life’s fundamental goal
of returning to the inanimate is thus, as paradoxical as this sounds, precisely the death drive. It is
the death drive that opens up the space (the scene) of achievements that stretch beyond the
ordinary, and beyond business as usual.”39
If one thinks of the death drive as a guide taking the organism to its own death, to a
different death, then in what sense is it present in our medically chaperoned demises; wellness
products, FDA standards, biopolitical measures, doctor’s appointments? This isn’t to say we
should refuse all of these, but merely to point out they attempt to universalize death. Our lives
might be different, but we all are set to ultimately die in similar positions, the organizational
ideal being the mass-produced death beds of hospitals. The death drive surges against this, it is a
force that refuses this sameness, and attempts to institute difference. Only by refuting this
sameness can Otherness be addressed, for the universalization of death brings with it an isolation
that attempts to remove all risks, to make life into solitary formulas for all individuals to plug
themselves into. The Other simply isn’t given the chance to appear because a confrontation with
Otherness would bring with it a divergence, an outburst of negativity, antithetical to
universalization, a domain that leaves no room for a relationship between the self and Other.
Deleuze associates death drive, or Thanatos, with the eternal return. For Deleuze, the
eternal return is an affirmation of difference, of the multiple, and everything of chance except
that which leads it to sameness and the necessary. The death drive governs this domain, as the
39
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driving force that introduces difference and excess. This brings us back to the ethics of risk
derived from Bataille, as affirmations of difference and chance to create events that reach the
level of the beyond. Deleuze associates this excess with play:
It is claimed that man does not know how to play: this is because, even when he is given
a situation of chance or multiplicity, he understands his affirmations as destined to
impose limits upon it, his decisions as destined to ward off its effects, his reproductions
as destined to bring about the return of the same, given a winning hypothesis. This is
precisely a losing game, one in which we risk losing as much as winning because we do
not affirm the all of chance: the pre-established character of the rule which fragments has
as its correlate the condition by default in the player, who never knows which fragment
will emerge.40
The alternative, is of course, a game in which the rules are not pre-established. This is precisely
where the potential for the impossible may become actualized. This also presents an opening
through which play can occur, through which difference is affirmed and one is able to live
precisely in excess. This is not a death drive that destroys, instead one that plays.
If you want a story on how praising death drive, being subversive for its own sake, starts
to go wrong, there’s no better place to look than Nick Land. For what is so unfortunate is that in
his essay Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production, he puts forth a
great interpretation and defense of the death drive. The remarks he responds to are the claims put
forth by Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze having gone against his position in Difference and
Repetition at this point) that align Nazism with the death drive. In response, Land argues that
fascism is no expression of the death drive but precisely a labor that attempts to push against it.
That the attempt to fight back against the death drive could produce such destruction is a
profound point to be emphasized, as it goes against the more intuitive conception in which that
which kills, that which is evil, would seemingly have to be an outlet for the scary-sounding
‘death drive.’ Instead, the attempt to eliminate difference ends up revealing itself to require vast
40
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amounts of destructive force. Land provides a list parodying D&G’s “How to Make yourself a
BwO” into “How to make oneself a Nazi,’ proceeding to provide stances against the death drive,
implying that if you fight the death drive or fail to acknowledge it, you risk falling into fascism. .
The irony, of course, is that Land ended up a fascist. In order to stage a defense of negativity and
the death drive, simultaneously critiquing the territory it could take me into, I turn to his list, to
use it and turn his words against himself:
1. Wherever there is impersonality and chance, introduce conspiracy, lucidity, and malice.
2. Burn Freud, and take desire back to the Kantian conception of will. Wherever there is
impulse, represent it as choice, decision, the whole theatrical drama of volition. Introduce
a gloomy atmosphere of oppressive responsibility by couching all discourses in the
imperative form
3. “Revere the principle of the great individual. Personalize and mythicize historical
processes.”41
Essentially the logic here is: embrace the death drive or fall into fascism. The list remains
apt today: the replacement of chance with conspiracy and ‘lucidity’ fits the far-right ideology of
today just as much as it always has, and emphasizes that chance’s relation to the death drive. The
stress placed upon choice and decision, not to mention responsibility (which has already been
exposed as a paradoxical concept through Derrida), characterize today more than ever—this will
be shown in the next chapter, but it is self-evident that today, we are drowned in choice and
selection: to the extent that unconscious desire seems obsolete. One reacts: “You’re telling me
I’m not choosing in this world of choices?” The last point is evident in fascism today as much as
ever, but not so much on a wider basis. However, it is in the first and the third that Land really
speaks against his future self. He loves the death drive for its ability to subvert order, to
destratify, intensify, and accelerate the processes that tear apart organization. This
accelerationism was present at the time of writing this, but again, was placed against nazism and
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fascism. However, over time for Land, Thanatos itself becomes a mystical force. Is
accelerationism not the ultimate mythicized historical process: that making history move faster
will take us to our rightful place? This is the domain of a transgression for transgression’s
sake—often associated with Bataille as well, though I have made an attempt to remove this from
him by showing its theoretical basis: that the law always brings with it transgressions. If one
goes too far in affirming the death drive’s ability to institute difference and create some utopia,
the concept begins to work against itself: it becomes its own force of the same. So while death
drive is affirmed and negativity embraced, this must be done along the lines of Bataille and
Deleuze. It must be a will toward the different, a complete affirmation of chance beyond any
preset rules. The function of impossibility here precludes drawing out any utopia, any
estimations of chance’s outcome that will lead us to conspiracy.
By attempting to throw reigns upon this force, it produces violence; conceptually as seen
in Nick Land’s turn to fascism, where he was seduced by a mystical force that will make things
right, inevitably turning chance and Otherness into sameness and predictability and making him
into an alt-right ideologue; and in action as seen in authoritarian governments, attempting to
impose order and make sure the negativity that will always remain rains down on the Other,
expunged from the system of sameness, creating very literal violence. Without an affirmation of
difference, one is precluded from states of excess. Access to the moral summit is increasingly
prohibited, with this, the ability to achieve Bataille’s level of communication in which existences
intermingle falters. But here I must be clear: reaching these points was never easy. Repeating
Deleuze: man doesn’t know how to play. Bataille’s communication was never a widespread
phenomenon only now precluded by porn and technology. This is not the point, instead, it is that
the current repression of negativity and death makes it harder to imagine actualizing the
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impossible. Interactions with Others suffer, and the inordinate amount of work it takes to find
love, to share an erotic moment, becomes further distant. In their place lies a fog of death that
steams up to our surface, that begins to saturate our air. A violent and destructive impulse lies
embedded in a world that refuses to face its negativity. This can assume many forms: from our
life becoming a desiccated routine to physical violence.
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Machinic Love Oracles and Freudian Sex-Terminators
Attraction is nuanced. I've been attracted to women who are ...well, who my friends
might think are ugly... I need an intellectual challenge. Apparently there's a term for
someone who gets turned on by intellectual stuff....What's the word? I want to say
'sodomy'?"
-Tinder’s CEO Sean Rad in an Interview with Evening Standard

Isolated with an Other
Sexual desire’s transformation into pornographic want continues in sex with others. I here
re-emphasize Baudrillard’s statement that even real sex is turning into porn. It isn’t that sex loses
its sexually stimulating components, in fact, these might even increase. What is lost is the
uncertainty, the negativity: the presence of any otherness. Sex becomes a sensory experience to
act out just as one does any other urges and wants. This is the process of desexualization, in
which sexual desires are flattened to the level of a want: just as one wants a new car, a certain
meal for dinner, one wants to have sex. A want is a purely conscious affair without any
negativity. It entails no transcendence of the ego, it doesn’t reach beyond, but simply seeks
fulfillment. Desire seeks completeness, to attain the impossible object that may complete it. Want
simply wants, and though it is insatiable, it has no endpoint in mind. It is under the domain of the
super-ego’s imperative to enjoy. The result of all of this is an elimination of space for the Other.
One never risks in the name of what one wants, the object must be elevated to a much higher
status. With desexualization’s pornographic want, the Other never takes on such a status. Sex
instead resembles two people masturbating with each others bodies, completely in their own
worlds. Violating the borders of the ego is no longer an option, it is something to be feared.
In the previous chapter, porn was shown to turn sex into pure stimulation. Sex here loses
all vitality through the loss of an excess, becoming a narcissistic isolated loop. However,
pornographic masturbation never wanted there to be an other. So maybe this is no cause for
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alarm. Even if it becomes a destructive force for some, taking precedence over sex itself, this
shouldn’t necessarily be such a worry for those who do go out into the world and have sex. Yet it
appears that this lack of Otherness remains even in our sex with Others. But for Lacan, has this
not always been the case? That ‘there is no sexual relation’?
This takes on a variety of meanings, but it could be summarized as two people inevitably
being stuck in their own fantasies, unable to meet each other, as each partner creates fictions
about their lover based off of certain traits, rather than facing their lover directly. There is never
an unmediated relation between the two because they both exist within the symbolic order of
social relations, which always mediates how they relate to each other through language and their
conceptions of themselves as individuals. Now, though I have explained how Bataille’s risk is
able to cross such an impossible plane, this fails to answer the criticism that nothing has changed.
For even if Bataille’s risk takes one to the impossible, the sexual relation can remain such an
impossibility, that fantasy always gets in the way. Are fantasies really that different if they come
from internet porn, and surely all fantasies cannot be said to result from porn? Such questions are
on the dot—which is why I turn to other fields, to show that the same logic of eliminating
negativity remains, and that this logic is fundamentally pornographic. If at time things appear
vague, to follow Bataille’s discussion of the Kinsey report, talking about real life sex practices
isn’t something that can ever be accurately studied, reported on, and turned into quantitative data.
The sexual phenomena of today, even if they cannot be measured, do point toward the fact that
the gap between me and my lover/Other, has become increasingly harder to cross. Sterilization
efforts have ensured that attempts toward the impossible, in which a unity is achieved, are
something to be feared, something not worth the risk. With the neutralization of such risk, sexual
experiences with others turns to pornography: a sex lacking in any negativity.
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The objects of study here will be dating apps and consent culture. These are two
wide-reaching phenomenon, and point toward what sex today looks like. Hook-up culture might
remain present, but coming out of the pandemic, after already having been worn down by social
media that prevents one night stands (the partner can be found online the next morning), it is
increasingly less prevalent. We are now in the era of consent culture and dating apps. And the
two share one massive similarity: a reliance on language and formula to convey desire. The
result: the maintained boundary between two egos, without any chance at dissolution.

Trying to Choose Love
The idea behind Tinder came from a stressful encounter at a coffee shop for founder Sean
Rad. He saw a girl sitting across the room looking at him. At first, he was scared. He figured she
had caught him sneaking looks. Yet upon noticing that she was smiling at him, he felt his anxiety
wash away. Recounting the incident, he said: “Then I started thinking about that and analyzing it,
and realized that if you can eliminate the question of whether or not someone wants to meet you,
then you would significantly take away the barriers to making a new connection. And that's
where the idea for Tinder came from.”42
In this, we isolate the fundamental principle of tinder: eliminating uncertainty regarding
whether or not someone wants to meet you. This uncertainty, for Rad, appears as an unnecessary
barrier to making a new connection. Much better to get rid of it so that people can meet without
anxiety. The user swipes through a list of profiles containing a handful of photos, and potentially
a short bio, favorite song, and Instagram account. One either likes or dislikes the profile, then
moves on to the next one. If two people like each other, they match, and only then can they
42
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message each other. The result is that if two people interact only under the pretense they are both
interested in each other, there is no need to worry that the other person isn’t into you.
Now, as much as I advocate for risk and uncertainty, is it really necessary all the time?
Doesn’t the ease of meeting other people in dating apps not open doors for people to make new
connections? For any freedom this has brought, it has come at a cost that must be emphasized.
When someone uses tinder, they are likely looking for: love, a casual sexual encounter, or,
sometimes, simply a friend. Before dating apps, for the most part, all of these relationships
sprung from contingent encounters. No one chose lovers and friends as if they were presented on
a packed supermarket shelf. This element of chance gives such relationships an extra dimension.
Since they weren’t founded upon choice, they have two outcomes: the relationships falter and
one realizes: “Well, it was a result of us both being in the same place, it likely wasn’t meant to
be” or they continue: “Though the circumstances were arbitrary, related to a certain stage in my
life, some turn of fate ended up producing a relationship that went on to transcend the
circumstances.” A childhood friend is never chosen, but because of this, takes on a more eternal
character: it almost has to appear fated that two people who have changed so much could remain
so close. For such a reason, Alan Badiou says that in love: “The absolute contingency of the
encounter takes on the appearance of destiny.”43 Love is never chosen, it is something that
retroactively one discovers. Upon such a discovery, through potential doubt and uncertainty, it
preserves, and one grows to consciously associate with a choice that was at first conscious.
On dating apps, all of this goes out the window. This is the premise of Eva Illouz’s work
Why Love Hurts: dating apps have placed love under the domain of technologies of choice. This
is the ultimate dominance of rationality: presented with an algorithmically delivered set of
potential people, one deduces via an extremely data-flat profile if they would be interested or
43
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not. The profiles are completely curated to show all of one’s best qualities, with none of the
downsides. Of course, these downsides, this Otherness that lies beneath one’s conscious sense of
ego, is precisely what true love is built upon. Yet, the profile forms the founding ideal of the
potential lover: an attractive person with similar interests who is, more importantly, interested in
you. There is no play, everything operates under a law of yes or no. The relationship begins with
a fully conscious choice that goes on to constantly get reaffirmed or denied. If there is any
contingency in the app—that one just happened to match with the perfect person for them—the
app is ultimately responsible. No matter how random it might seem and even be, you can’t say
that the dating app didn’t do its job.
Eva Illouz argues that dating apps have created a love market, through which “one can
compare values attached to people, and opt for ‘the best bargain.’44 Love becomes rationalized, a
project one carries out through conscious choice: there is no contingency, instead, one searches
for the maximal outcome, a partner that fits a pre-set criteria ranging from psychological makeup
to literal makeup. The rationalizing function of choice here works to eliminate risk, to make love
no longer an unconscious process but instead a conscious calculus. One result of this is the
paradox of choice: faced with more choices, we end up less satisfied, for there is always the
doubt that one might have chosen incorrectly. For Illouz, this creates commitment phobia:
“Freedom becomes aporetic, for in its realized form, it leads to the incapacity or lack of desire to
exercise choice.”45 Following Badiou’s formula for love, this ensures that the contingent
encounter doesn’t transform into destiny: there was always a different path that could have been
taken. There is no contingency, and as a result, no fate: agency always remains in the subject
who has selected their lover. By attempting to remove this contingency in love, a supposed
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obstacle that has marred it for so long, the strength of love itself begins to weaken. Love
becomes not so much about a shared relation between two people, but the choosing subject
picking the most efficient possibility. In this vein, love becomes a narcissistic project reliant
upon what one’s best option is—the lover becomes the element filled into an already picked out
formula. Again, if someone says this has already been the case, one picks the lover that attempts
to fill into their fantasy, then never before has the process of choosing been so rationalized. Sure,
there is a rationalism in the interplay of marriage between upper classes historically. But this was
by no means coming out of choice, it was a decision made by two families to maintain power,
etc. It wasn’t that the young prince had an ideal and he went through his options: it was chosen
for him. Now, with dating apps, love is presented as a commodity, the prospective lover
self-advertising their best possible image. As one swipes, one consciously follows what they
want. Desire’s contingency plays much less of a role here, instead, partners consist of two people
that want each other, that view each other as most optimal. Little do they realize, their best fit
might not be the person who seems to check all the boxes upon first impression. Dating apps
eliminate the negativity that allows love to override such determinations, under the assumption
that one will love those who one thinks one loves.
Along similar lines, Illouz argues that ideal lovers disappear under choice:
“Idealization—as a process central to the experience of love—is becoming increasingly
difficult to achieve, precisely because of the ontologization of selves, which encourages
the scrutiny of others’ makeup, and a parsing into discrete attributes, which prevents
holistic evaluation of the another.”46
There is much less idealization in a conscious process of checking boxes. Reducing people to
attributes removes the role of an imaginary that fills in the gaps. Creating a whole through such a
fantasy is a truer way of facing Otherness than reducing the Other to discrete parts and ignoring
the negativity beyond them. The Other is transformed into lists of values and probabilities.
46
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The hidden part of them is chalked up to margin of error, to the probability machine making a
mistake, rather than the truth in us all: we cannot be wholly known.
Byung Chul-Han critiques Illouz, saying that the problem is not too much choice, but the
erosion of the Other: “However, this sociological theory fails to recognize that another influence
is now underway, which is corroding love far more than endless freedom or unlimited
possibilities. The crisis of love does not derive from too many others so much as from the
erosion of the Other.”47 But is it not clear that too many others, all churned through the
rationalization of choice, constitutes precisely the erosion of the Other? The logic of choice,
which attempts to get rid of all uncertainty, all play of chance, functions to make the Other into a
commodity that lacks all Otherness, instead consisting of probabilities rather than an irrational
domain of uncertainty in which no calculations hold, in which anything is possible. This is the
narcissism inherent to a love that proceeds by choice and refuses negativity: one attempts to
hedge one’s bets against all buyer’s remorse. In this sense, the “overwhelming sentiment of
uniqueness which was once the character of the love sentiment has changed…drowned in the
sheer number of partners.”48 carries Chul-Han’s point, for uniqueness is contained in uncertainty.
In the deluge of partners and choice, there is no room for this: everyone is reduced to discrete
values that lack such uncertainty, as no calculus can account for such extreme plays of chance.
But surely, dating apps cannot be discussed only as some pursuit of love. A lot of people
ostensibly don’t get on tinder to find love, they are looking for something more casual. And it’s
hard to criticize this without falling into a conservative prudeness, critiquing casual sex itself.
But by setting out on these apps, making the initial choice to enter into something casual, one
creates a certain destiny for the ensuing relationship with the other: I begin by wanting
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something no-strings-attached or looking for a date, and I stick by this choice. The faulty
presupposition: I always know what I want. The element of contingency is removed, and the
stress is on the conscious decision made here. Casual sex used to be more casual because of such
contingency, relying on bumping into attractive people in the real world. There is something
inherently uncasual about dedicating serious amounts of time swiping through people in search
of a ‘casual hook-up.’ One is seeking to maximize their experience, their pleasure, off of
superficial profiles from which they derive their answer to the yes or no: yes, I would like to
have a one-night stand with this person, who I’ll inevitably have to court for at least a couple
days. There is no inbetween, one locks into this before seeing the real person—so of course there
is the fear of a ‘catfish,’ a profile that is at ends with the person, but obviously this always
happens to a degree. Most of the time, the likeness is there just enough to go through with the
path one has already chosen. The real image and imagined reductive profile image are made to
be close enough. One fears the negativity of any presence of love in a ‘casual’ relationship, any
of the excess that is brought out by two people interacting with each other. Much easier to keep
one’s defenses up, not open up any Otherness, and correspond with the reductive list of attributes
you have made yourself and your hookup to have. That way, there is no crossing of any
boundaries, both can remain full individuals, not intruded upon by Otherness and all the risk it
brings. Sex becomes a contractual event in which two people use each other for pleasure. This
isn’t bad in itself, but the problem is that negativity and a deeper bond is blocked off. You fuck
me and I fuck you and as long as our true selves don’t get in the way, we can keep doing it and
go about our lives as if normal.
Sex becomes an appointment, a scheduled away part of the day offering a release without
negativity so we can maintain functioning in society. In this sense, sex gains a function, losing its
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excessive nature, blocking any presence of romance and love. Hook-up culture has lost its
dominance because dating apps have taken this principle of easy release even further: one
doesn’t even need to have the sex side of things anymore. Illouz notes the New York Times’s
college love stories contest changing from casual sex into Internet-mediated relationships, and
quotes from it: “Unlike the sexual risk-taking of the hookup culture, this is love so safe that
what’s most feared is not a sexually transmitted disease but a computer virus, or perhaps meeting
the object of your affection in person.”49 It is much easier to get all the benefits of this by doing
the least physical interaction. Whether one hooks up with people or carries out a relationship
over texting, the bottom line is that sexual desire is given a functional outlet that keeps it
partitioned off, away from risk and any overflow into the ‘important’ things in our lives: work,
friends, health, etc. This fantasy of love without its contingency and negativity is impossible. It is
the death of love, for love and eroticism are forces that always intrude. Our desexualized culture
is a bulwark against this, in which sex is made to have an end and never interfere beyond this, for
that would be too irrational. Pornographic want expresses itself in the fact that sex has grown to
fear all negativity. A love without physical contact becomes a similar extreme: love without the
negativity of having to interact in real life, where body language and intimacy might intrude on
something good as is.
Narcissism prevails, for there is no willingness to drop down one’s boundaries, to allow
any intrusion. Casual sex’s goal precludes this, and dating app based love (whose logic carries
over to the environment as well, one goes on to swipe in reality as well) inevitably contains the
narcissism of wanting a reduced other who checks off the entire list, a process that inevitably
means ignoring the gaps between these attributes in which their true Otherness exists.
Pornographic want replaces sexuality and ensures that, regardless of whether we watch porn or
49
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use dating apps, we are all caught up in a cultural narcissism that intends to find sexual
satisfaction and love with none of the negativity.
Not to mention the role dating apps play in reducing courting to pure language. Words
against a blank background, attempting to get to one’s core through inevitably formulaic
surface-level conversation. One is talking with a precise goal: to get to know one another.
Removed are the excessive contingencies of the environment, no, this is a conversation in a
vacuum. One gets down to business. I need to know if I can love you…so what type of music do
you listen to? The inevitable formulaic nature this courting takes on results from its repetitive
aspect: both parties have likely gone through this drill many many times. It is repeated because
one hopes things suddenly ‘click.’ But this click lacks the contingency, it is more so a ‘guess and
check’ type of process. All of a sudden, one finds the variable they’ve been plugging into the
same formula: a slow exchange of hello’s, questions, maybe the odd pick-up line (the most
absurd display of courting and ‘one’s personality’ to occur in a vacuum, without body language
or environment). Illouz says that: “Language interferes with the processes of visual and bodily
evaluation and recognition. Verbal overshadowing is the interference of verbal modes of
evaluation from the processes of visual recognition.”50 In today’s emphasis on language, the
mode of the universal, we speak precisely to void ourselves of our individuality. To return to
Derrida’s silence, our deeper relation to the Other is something that cannot be justified, spoken
and reasoned out. Our reliance on the distilled, formulaic language of messaging ensures that two
people can get to know each other without having to face otherness. In dating apps, one finds a
literalized ‘medium is the message’: the form of the apps is incredibly compressed, one has a
conversation based upon the conventions of the platform and ultimately, the exchanges are a
meaningless feeling-things-out to decide whether or not one wants to continue, to double down
50
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on their initial choice. The physical interaction at the end of it is something to be dreaded almost.
The excitement in such a relationship is from the raw language of a message back: the encounter
with the real person, who exists in a different form as the imagined technological ideal, instead
promotes an anxiety rather than the nervous excitement usually found in love. Love and
eroticism should make one nervous, not anxious. Today, however, the meeting of the bodies, the
purported purpose of the exchange, tends not to be an exciting consummation of the process, but
an anxiety-soaked necessity. That’s why Illouz and the New York Times state the fear of STDs
has been overtaken by the fear of a computer virus (and I’d add: the artificial profile, someone
playing a complete game with their match): the physical and psychical reality that lies behind
these exchanges is even avoided at times. This is the modern-day logic of courtly love: go
through all the steps except the consummation of your desire, for this will always end in
disappointment. In fact, it is something to be feared. Much better to get one’s bodily urges
expressed through the empty times of the day over messages so one can return to what really
matters than actually have sex, actually even meet the other, which brings with it the possibility
that there has been negativity present in the encounter one carried out securely up to that point.
Ultimately, sex with others becomes not so different than solitary sex. One chooses one’s
sexual partners and lovers under the condition that things are carried out rationally. Any presence
of negativity threatens one’s borders, maybe even throws one out of the narcissistic feedback
loop and replaces the ego as a love-object with someone else. This inevitably entails a
confrontation with Otherness, the negativity we are so willing to avoid. But again, it always
returns. And here, it is not so easily found as in the guilt of porn watching, rather, an ultimately
dissatisfying and emptiness pervading relations. One is with people, but alone. Any
confrontation with Otherness is the ultimate threat: for always, every single time, it will disrupt
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the rational conscious fantasy that is able to sustain a love without negativity. By opening up to
the Other, one doesn’t get a reward, but always is forced to come to terms with the fact that their
rationalized love, their choice and agency, is a farce. The ensuing choice then is: do I continue
and thus threaten my beautiful functional arrangement, or do I flee, and begin the process all
over again.
Consent culture is the elevation of this logic to a juridical-legalized form. Here, I must
make things completely clear: this is no polemic against consent culture in itself. For it would
not have to exist had there not been a rape culture to respond to. The stigmatization of victims,
lack of legal enforcement, and a low incidence of reporting, all require a response. It makes
perfect sense that in response to such a widespread culture of sweeping things under the rug,
consent culture would arrive and remove gray areas: for in these gray areas, people have and still
excuse horrible things. However, the crux of my critique here is that sexuality and eroticism,
inevitably, are messy and contain blurred lines. It is not my position to say we should reel things
back, but merely to critique the effects of this ensuing push-back, and place them within their
wider context. As it is a response to our current sexual practices, it is clear that is does mirror the
overall push occurring in my argument. This is no crude proclamation that it kills the risk in sex,
that there’s any need for a risk that does lead to violence. But that at the core of eroticism and
sexuality, this risk is always present, and fails to get covered up by a reductive and restrictive
framework.
Consent culture is a formalized version of the logic found in dating apps in the sense that
it prioritizes language and attempts to rationalize sex into a correct formula. The truth is, this can
never be successful. Language fails to tell the truth of desire, and in the context of a sexual
encounter consisting of a systematic: “Is this okay?” “Would you like me to do this?” The
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responses never will give the full truth. Desire cannot accurately be expressed in formulaic
language. Sure, part of consent culture is the identification of power imbalances that attempt to
criticize what are to-the-letter consensual exchanges, but the emphasis on language’s ability to
convey what people truly desire ultimately fails to tidy up sex. The main negative repercussion is
that a sexual exchange can follow the formula, be consensual by the letter, but still contain
violence within it. The other repercussion occurs between two lovers who—and even this feels
like a risk to say—both certainly would sacrifice all for each other, would never seek to hurt each
other. By binding up their sex in a formula, there is the possibility of their sex never reaching the
realm of the particular. They are both acting out proper sex, based off each other’s words, while
their inner desires remain shackled. Speaking in the act of sex, specifically saying what one
wants, can remove the uncertainty and risk that gives it is excess. This is obviously not to say
one should always take such a risk, but that it certainly shouldn’t be completely precluded. The
spontaneity of sex instead takes on a premeditated character. It all gets reduced to conscious
choice. The truth of the matter is that some people don’t consciously know what they desire, and
also that enunciation might make something a turn-off. This can be true and still not function as
an excuse for sexual assault, but shows the challenges of policing this territory, pointing toward
why things would get so rigidified in consent culture: it is better that we eliminate an excuse that
protects women against sexual assault, even if the cost is that certain aspects of erotic experience
suffer. Regardless, what we have lost must be put into view, and placed into the context of an
overall movement in which love and sex are taken fully to the domain of consciousness and
enunciation. It is evident that the rationalized, desexualized use of language in dating apps
corresponds to this movement in a contractualized sexual practice.
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For consent culture is also response to hook-up culture, where intoxication comes into
play and with it questions of agency, and guards women against the risks of having sex with a
man who might not respect their boundaries. The potential effect it does have, however, is
wrapping up sexuality into a pure upkeep of boundaries, as if this is something always to be
avoided, even potentially in love, where their dissolution is precisely the entrance into the
beyond and a mutual recognition. Here, I return to Bataille. Speaking on various forms of
communication; words, symbols, laughter, bodily movements, and their potential to take people
outside their existence, into the domain of the others, he gives one condition for this transcendent
unity. His summit communication can only occur “if there’s some consent, if not to annihilation,
then to risking yourself and, in the same impulse, risking other people.”51 This is the consent I
advocate for. There is, of course, no legal formula for this. And by no means do I advocate for it
replacing a legal framework that might be necessary. But regardless, it must be said that to reach
eroticism, and attain a true continuity between the self and the Other, there must be such a
situation in which two people consent precisely to a risk and accept each other's negativity. This
is not to be implemented into meaningless hook-ups, that would be a contradiction anyway. It is
instead to be posited as the erotic ideal shared between two lovers. What consent culture
precludes through the rigidification of the sexual exchange, is precisely this scenario: two
individuals completely risking themselves, going beyond language and face each Other. For only
through such a sacrifice can the greatest ecstasy and excess, bond between two lovers, occur.
If sex is reduced to a pure contract precluding such an act, sexual partners sacrifice any
chance at sacrifice, any attempt at reaching toward a beyond. Security is gained—and it certainly
should be—but the repercussions of such a social movement occurring when our sexuality
already, as we’ve shown, holds deep inconsistencies, inevitably ends up paving the way for an
51
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ideal sexual scenario in which sex is a narcissistic act between two complete individuals with no
room for their Others, since making room for the Other means opening up space for uncertainty
and silence.

Sex Terminators
And then, in the final stage, a new ideal image of woman is created in media that
attempts to physically reify sex with others into solitary sex and a fear of the body: prosthetics as
a mask for materiality. This is a much more speculative side of analysis, but the traces are
certainly there to begin to move to such conclusions. The idea here is that, following current
trends, the sexual ideal for men might become a woman whose appearance is as synthetic as
possible. The natural body grows increasingly abjected to the extent that it begins to remind one
of materiality too much, as the sexual ideal becomes more and more rooted in immateriality and
the digital. The sublime woman becomes a perfect silicon body. We are already beginning to be
met with such an image on Instagram, in celebrity models, and with pornstars.
Contrary to Donna Haraway’s Cyborg, a figure that threatens distinctions between
human-machine, culture-nature, human-animal, the prosthetic body shows a certain fear of
materiality. It is true that the end result puts into question where the synthetic or prosthetic
element begins and its integration with the rest of the body. But this is merely in the process of
removing traces of materiality. Physical imperfections become abjected. The ‘machine’ element
does not put the distinction into question so much as attempts to gain mastery over the negativity
of the body. What is obviously emphasized is sterility and technology. Much better to have this
than a natural body. This way, Otherness will not have to be present.

72

The image of a sublime woman works to desexualize all those who don’t reach her peak,
realistically, those women who a man will actually interact with. Sybil Stallone, a pornstar escort
who has spent half a million dollars on cosmetic surgeries, says: “I’m the sex-terminator. No sex
robot has a chance.”52 and:
I am literally built for sex. In our modern age of virtual reality, teledildonics, and sex
robots, sex buyers are constantly looking for a more unique experience. Through my
enhancements, I offer my lovers something that transcends human, better than anything
you could get with a sex robot or most other women. I’m the best of both worlds – a
living sex doll.53
Sybil Stallone attempts to transcend sex by becoming a purely sexual being, mechanically
perfected to eliminate all the non-sexual imperfections. What is lost here is precisely the ground
of eroticism. By becoming the perfect sexual object, sexuality itself is eliminated for it relies on
this remainder. It instead grows pornographic. For is it not extremely perverse that a supposed
sexual ideal would be a living sex doll, rather than just a living human? Shouldn’t sex robots
never have had a chance to begin with? It makes sense that in someone who attempts to
completely sexualize themselves, sex itself would be viewed in a business-like way—that half a
million dollars would simply be an investment. The process of becoming a fully sexualized being
takes one out of the erotic domain and under the principle of rationality: “Porn is branding to me,
and it is a way to find more target markets than passport stamps.”54 It may seem too easy to use a
pornstar as an example here, but from Kim Kardashian to Bella Hadid, the creation of an image
through surgery as well as photoshop ensures that those who stand on the pedestal of eroticism
end up to potentially be too perfect: hence desexualized. The ideal becomes a sexual partner who
lacks all negativity, including even a body. This creates an image similar to the Lady present in
courtly love: “the element of idealizing exaltation that is expressly sought out in the ideology of
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courtly love has certainly been demonstrated; it is fundamentally narcissistic in character’.”55
Zizek identifies this lady also with the dominatrix of masochism. She is an inhuman image that
symbolizes a radical Otherness and unknowability. Upon this gap, idealization is carried out
precisely to hide all traces of this Otherness:
Deprived of every real substance, the Lady functions as a mirror onto which the subject
projects his narcissistic ideal—or, to quote Christina Rossetti’s sonnet ‘In an Artist’s
Studio’ which speaks of Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s relationship to Elizabeth Siddal, his
Lady: ‘not as she is, but as she fills his dream.’56
This is not to remove women’s agency here, but to emphasize the physical reification of a
masculine desire in such prosthetics, especially as it correlates with an overall argument that sees
negativity cleansed in sex, replaced with pure sexual stimulation. The elimination of materiality
in the body is the physical manifestation of this. The inhuman transcendence of the sublime
woman ends up providing the perfect mirror on which the narcissistic circuit may be maintained.
In the creation of such a sublime image, sex with Others can be carried out in pure narcissism.
This is the literal manifestation of pornographic want, for those men who do desire such an
image: they want a human body that is pure sexual stimulation with no excess. In the execution
of such demands, half a million dollar bodies, this is made a reality. The irony, of course, is that
this reality is one that attempts to completely maintain one’s own fantasy, to remove any trace of
negativity that threatens to surface as Otherness. One is able to have sex with an Other purely as
a narcissistic act. Now, for many men, this might have always been the case. But the distinction
to be made is in the physical manifestation of this desire: they truly don’t have to deal with the
negativity of the body, it carries too much Otherness, threatening to impede their narcissistic
fantasy.
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Sex dolls mark a similar movement. A Kazakhstani bodybuilder married a sex doll, only
to instead fall in love with an ashtray.57 One wants to masturbate, but with the illusion of having
sex with another person. Increasingly realistic sex dolls effectively give people the ability to have
sex with someone else, while not having to face any Otherness, any possibility of negativity.
They can have sex-nearly-like sex with someone else, but in reality, they’re just maintaining their
narcissistic indulgence.
This all isn’t to say that sex with a sex doll or the appearance of cosmetic surgery is some
horrible thing. The point is that such movements mark a physical correlation to our new form of
sexuality, one that lacks any lack, any negativity. Sex increasingly prioritizes outlets that
maintain its narcissism, hiding from the negativity of the Other that would break through and
threaten this. Pornographic want is precisely this new form of sexuality, one that is pure
stimulation with no presence of uncertainty. “Today, even real sex is turning into porn.”58 Sex is a
pure functional release, and getting in the way of this rationalization is negativity, which
threatens to take it into arbitrary, irrational realms. Here, the death drive is pushed down upon. It
is a will towards a different sex, a refusal of uniformity and organization, especially in eroticism,
the pinnacle of life at excess. Instead of viewing death drive as a destructive, aggressive force, it
ends up being through the attempts to block negativity and institute organizational sameness that
this destruction is created.
I began by showing porn’s attempt to push down upon negativity. The result is the
betrayal of one’s ultimate desire, creating a guilt that leaves its subjects helplessly in need. Not to
mention, it makes them learn to want a sexual experience not to be found in reality, one that
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lacks Otherness, that consists of pure sexual stimulation for its narcissistic subject. This
pornographic mode carries into sex with Others, for individuals precisely attempt to minimize all
risk and uncertainty, and make romance into an efficient machine, one in which they choose and
want, rather than go with a deeper desire that lies below conscious awareness. This reaches its
physical manifestation in increasingly prosthetic ideals and sex dolls. One wants to have sex with
none of the risks, none of the traces of negativity that bring with it an encounter with Otherness.
As a result, eroticism and love falter. The narcissistic subject of today learns to fear any
difference, to instead only live rationally, off of functional movements without excess. Life
becomes survival, it rejects all the excess that negativity brings, and thus rejects life. The
negativity we push down upon resurfaces in a life that resembles death: what else could a life
without love mean?
And, as we will be shown in the next chapter, the project of attempting to eliminate all
traces of the death drive, to fill in every gap of negativity, doesn’t only enact a violence upon
ourselves, a cutting oneself off from the world, inevitably leading us to the emptiness of
narcissism, in which life is represented by a dull hum. For in the violence of incels, their
outbursts expose our sexuality’s internal contradiction. Only for so long can we maintain an
existence of sameness without malfunction. Often, this comes at the expense of Others at the
limits: this is the domain of necropolitics, where the gift of death is given in plain sight, but it
might as well be a secret, for we are unwilling to acknowledge the evil carried out in order to
sustain the good. We are unwilling to admit that even our most ethical moments come at a cost.
In the violence of incel shootings, the relationship between sex and death converges, revealing
that the expulsion of negativity is not sustainable. In the incel the death drive doesn’t suddenly
burst out of the floor. Instead, the project of pushing the death drive down creates this very
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violence, the incel representing this process at its most radical limits. The narcissistic subjects we
all are find their logical conclusion in the incel’s mass shooting: every other individual not only
presents a risk to the incel, something so horrifying, so dirty to their sterile organizations, that
they must be eliminated. Of course, this also brings the acknowledgment that the self itself holds
this negativity, this dirtying force. Here, the outer and inner annihilation of the incel and his
victims shows a desire for the system to become so rational as to not need its subjects. Much
better to have a sterile machine carrying out tasks, pushing history forward, without the presence
of humans and any negativity that seeks to depart from the fixed teleological plan. It only makes
sense that in extremely sexually frustrated men, who inevitably hold this fearful view of
negativity and all it contains (for them, sexuality and women), their bodily urges find only one
expression to take them to the beyond: death itself.
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Incels-Shooters: the return of repressed death
Also, any of the "Practice Papers'' left on my coffee table I used or the notes in my gym
bag can be published freely. I will not be embarased [sic], because, well, I will be dead.
Some people like to study that stuff. Maybe all this will shed insight on why some people
just cannot make things happen in their life, which can potentially benefit others.
-Blog of Incel-Shooter George Sodini
Death Lives
If the argument so far has seemed too steeped in metaphor, that sexuality may have
become more functional, less concerned with risk, more narcissistic—but surely not dead—then
with the incel shooter, this death reveals itself as no longer so abstract. The violent incel,
frustrated with his ‘inability’ to find a sexual partner, a desire which burns inside of him
producing extreme pressure, finds an eventual outlet: pure death, the complete annihilation of
himself and others. Maybe this isn’t a transformation, maybe no accursed sublimation is going
on here. It isn’t that sexual desire is expressing itself through other means, but remaining what it
is, an aspiration to dissolve all boundaries. The dead sexuality of our society displays itself
through the seemingly contingent and arbitrary outbursts of incel mass shootings. As Bataille
shows, this link between sex and death has always been present. Sex and death both represent a
state of continuity opposed to the discontinuous being of our day-to-day selves. They allow
access to a plane of communication without individuality. If this link was always there, why has
the incel phenomenon only now begun to occur? Following Baudrillard, it is because death has
been repressed from life, in an attempt to vanquish all sources of negativity—but the repressed
always returns. In this exchange between sex and death, in which sexuality has grown to lack all
otherness, it has been cut off from its ability to achieve dissolution. In its place lies only death.
The sexuality of our current time screams in the violence of the incels: where sex was, death
shall be.
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The incel is an isolated, narcissistic figure, plugged into a digital world and disconnected
from the social one (is it only them that fit this description?). Unable to have the sex they feel
they so desperately need, they eventually give up any plans to court women. Hiring a prostitute is
not an option for them, they don’t feel it would count: it is obviously not sexual stimulation itself
they desire, the raw act of fucking, but a social something more. They build their resentment
after their failed—often very few—attempts to find sex in the real world. This resentment
eliminates the desire for sex itself, all they feel instead is the need for revenge, to send a message
to the whole world of sex-having people that they feel conspires against them. A message paid in
blood, theirs and others: women as the main targets but not only, for they feel pushed to violence
by the entire world of those who have sex, they hate all the men and women that have sex and
have seemingly conspired to exclude them. In their murder-suicide, le petit mort, the little death,
is exchanged for the big death, an inverse implosion beginning outside of them and coming to an
end in themself.
The first incel shooting59 occured in 2007 in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It was
carried out by George Sodini, a data programmer at a law firm, who killed three people and shot
seven before killing himself. The notes he left at the scene of the crime weren’t released to the
public. But he had posted on a blog for about seven months building up to the shooting. In his
final post, he concludes with four ‘miscellaneous’ facts about himself:
Miscellaneous
1. Probably 99% of the people who know me well don't even think I was this crazy. Told
by at least 100 girls/women over the years I was a "nice guy". Not kidding.
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2. Lee Ann Valdiserri had my baby in early 1991. Haven't seen her since she was about
four months into it. I knew her sister, Chris, from high school.
3. Net worth slightly more than $250K, (after all debt) as of end of 2008.
4. Death Lives!60
Those last words are what led me down this path of analysis. In writing this, I had first set out
simply to understand the incel. I thought that their violence constituted the ultimate symptom of
our current state of sexuality and that the meaning of their outbursts has gone hitherto
unsearched for. How could it be that a relatively recent phenomenon of mass violence is so easily
explained away as something arbitrary: a result of mental illness, media attention, and gun laws?
None of it got anywhere near the core of the issue. Looking at George Sodini, I couldn’t
understand these last words. What did he mean by ‘Death Lives!’? In the context of his blog, the
words didn’t make any sense. Sure, he would speak on his sexual frustration, but never did his
anger even have an object, it more so spoke of his defeat. The proclamation was of an intensity
not found elsewhere in his blog. Throughout it, he would allude to his revenge plan—exit
plan—he called it, but he never gave a real reason: even though the blog began with the words:
“Why do this?? To young girls? Just read below. I kept a running log that includes my thoughts
and actions, after I saw this project was going to drag on.” Maybe the answer was in his
undisclosed papers, but for him to not speak of any reason for why violence and suicide were the
only answer elsewhere seems incredibly odd. Other incels write manifestos directing all their
anger towards women, the world of people who have sex, and the revenge to be enacted against
them. Yet George Sodini, obviously with moments of misogyny but, nothing so overt, never gets
anywhere close to this. He simply logged his isolation and brought up memories of frustration,
the overall message being that he had given up. So why, all of a sudden, does he write ‘Death
Lives?’ an incredibly cryptic end to a concrete log of his life? How could it possibly be that the
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first incel, by no means attempting to start a movement of violence, would say something so on
the dot; to declare that Death Lives and begin a chain of mass shootings? Reading Sodini’s blog,
aside from all the depressing isolation and self-deprecation, one almost gets the sense that he felt
he didn’t have a choice. There is no ecstasy in the discussion of his plan; he is in a constant
process of pushing it off. He has to eliminate all distractions to do it. He is unwilling to take the
risk of approaching women, he keeps to himself and even renounces sex, saying ‘it would just
get in the way at this point’, yet feels ready to carry out a plan at the most extreme of stakes,
precisely because he couldn’t have the sex that no longer even mattered to him.
Faced with this confusion, I realized that if I was interested in the incel for being a
symptom, a microcosm of the dark underside inherent to our current sexuality and society, then
Sodini appeared to, in his last words, speak the truth of this underside. What it meant remained
ambiguous, but the sense of a self-perceived destiny that one gets in looking at Sodini’s blog
seemed to hold the potential to explain how his violence, and the repetitions of it that followed,
were a radical symptom of how in our society, death lives while sexuality dies.
This occurs when as part of an overall movement in which all the negativity of life, that
radical Otherness which at its furthest limits means death, is wiped away, repressed, and
sterilized. Anything that is uncertain, that is not the same as me, that lacks function and instead
occurs at the level of the arbitrary and the beyond, is avoided. The result of this is an isolation
that can only sustain itself off of narcissism, taking the ego as one’s love-object. In this feedback
loop, the repressed negativity always returns. The return is in a life that begins to resemble death.
Sexuality, the pinnacle of life at excess, begins to occur on the same plane as eating a great
sandwich: “This burger is as good as a sex.” Death lives because life is saturated with death and
lacks any oscillation, becoming a state of lowest possible tension not far from the Nirvana
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principle. Life is what has truly been done away within this equation. In the mundanity of dead
sex, which goes hand in hand with dead life, there are no longer any means to enact
communication, to confront Otherness and negativity, except in the state of continuity that
remains permitted: death.
This is said to show that the incel’s violence constitutes a distilled image of a society in
which sexuality is desexualized, and everything is turned into death. This is similar to
Baudrillard’s description of domestic terrorism, where he describes their acts as being both “an
exorbitant mirror for the system of its own repressive violence, and the model of a symbolic
violence which is always forbidden [in] it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death.”61 The
sense in which the mass shootings are a mirror of the repressive violence are that they make
visible the gift of death: the fact that our very ways of life depend on a sacrifice, that some live
while others die. They make visible the fact that our way of life comes at a violent cost, and in
the Western world’s incidence of mass shootings lies a reflection of all the horrors enacted upon
the rest of the world, on all those deemed Other, including those in our societies, that fuel the
positivity of our sameness. The way they enact the symbolic violence comes precisely out of
their arbitrariness: while our ‘civilized’ violence is justified by function and law, the symbolic
violence of the terrorist, foreign or domestic, displays dying in the name of something, beyond
rationality and necessity. They enact a self-destruction within a system that maintains itself
through the destruction of Otherness. It is not us that are supposed to die, it is them. The
negativity supposedly eliminated, cut off from us, resurfaces.
This is not said as praise, but to bring out all the ways that their violence exposes what is
faulty in our current system, how they are very much a part of it. Byung Chul-Han finds
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Baudrillard to attribute a subversive effect in the terrorist’s enacting of symbolic violence, and
argues against it:
The protagonists of Baudrillard’s death revolt are suicidal characters of every kind. He
even attributes a kind of subversive potential to terrorism. But a suicide bomber opposes
the death-negating system with his real death. His [the suicide bomber’s] violent end
cannot open up the system to symbolic exchange with death. Terrorism is not a
counter-image to the capitalist system; it is a phenomenon that is symptomatic of that
system. The brutality and emotional coldness of the suicide bomber reflect the brutality
and coldness of capitalist society. The attacker has the same psychogram as members of
the general population. 62
But as I have said, Baudrillard does not deny this point, for he also finds terrorism to mirror the
system. It is just that he adds that their acts display a forbidden symbolic violence in their
self-destruction. It isn’t so much that this offers it a subversive potential: for they remain a mirror
of the system, but instead that they display the hidden excess of the system, that though
forbidden, sacrifice still occurs upon the Otherness that appears to be hidden. For all that
function and rationality dominates in our life, and seemingly ensures that death cannot be
symbolic, cannot be expended arbitrarily, there remains across the board an enacting of this
violence: at the largest scale in the supposed calculations of war that regardless carry out
needless violence against civilians, at the smaller scale in the ‘random acts’ of violent crime
across our society. It is clear that for all the elimination of negativity within the closed system of
a sameness, a violent excess still must be carried out, no matter how rational, there is a necessary
excess to maintain it. Though it is forbidden, this symbolic death provides the foundation for the
very law that forbids it. And necessarily, this negativity cannot be maintained as an external
threat, for the process of sterilizing it always means it spurts back up internally: it is not
something that can be controlled, the system cannot help but self-destruct. Of course, society
struggles to process this. The horrifyingly random aspect of such violence, that it could happen
to any of us, causes it to be justified as an anomaly. A thing of chance we simply have to hope
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doesn’t occur. These acts aren’t a result of the subversive death drive that I praise, but instead
result from pushing back against this death drive. The death drive, seeking to raise tension, to
subvert order and will Otherness, is fought against with everything the system has. Its force is
displaced; entropy reigns outside our limits in order to maintain order and sameness. But this can
never fully succeed, it always returns. In theory, the random violence carried out by people with
“the same psychogram as members of the general population” should force us to realize the very
fact that this means the violence isn’t random, that something horrible is going on at a much
greater scale. Yet instead, it gets painted as a thing of a chance, ultimately defined as a sad
necessity we have to deal with to maintain our way of life. But why risk such violence and horror
precisely in the name of a risk-free life that is thought to do away with such negativity, to be
safe? Here, the paradoxical truth of the outbursts comes to light: an unwillingness to face
negativity and death ultimately ensures a confrontation with random violence. Unfortunately, the
inability to read these symptomatic outbursts ensures that they continue, that the rallying charge
‘Death Lives’ is repeated two-fold: in the continuation of incel violence and in all the internal
failures of a system that reduces life to bare life.
Chul-Han’s critique of Baudrillard notwithstanding, he makes the point to show how
terrorism is inherent to our society, which he succinctly describes:
His suicide is a form of self-production, imagined as the ultimate selfie. The pulling of
the trigger that detonates the bomb is akin to the push of the camera’s button. The suicide
bomber knows that, immediately after the attack, his photograph will circulate in the
media, and he will then receive the attention he had previously missed out on. A suicide
bomber is a narcissist with an explosive belt. Thus, terrorism can be understood as the
ultimate form of authenticity.63
While he is talking about suicide bombers, it is clear here that it applies incredibly well to the
incel. Post-mortem, the incel finally gets the attention he was, for so long, denied. His
authenticity lies in the fact that he fully embodies the narcissism of today. I extend this even
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further, in that the incel shows that sex has been replaced by death, and that there is no Other,
only an external world to fear and eliminate. Still, this all fails to answer the question of why
incels carry out their violence. If it is revenge, then why does it take such a violent form, and
why suicide at the end? And surely it can’t be revenge can’t be the main motivation if George
Sodini, the first incel, appears to not even have this vengeful urge, instead holding a more
mysterious reason, hidden from his text. Not to mention, the incel’s connection to masculinity
must be questioned: why is it that only men are carrying this out? And are they connected to the
alt-right—is this a fascist desire?
Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies takes us into the arena of masculinity and its
connection to violence, it is a masterpiece study on why men desire fascism, and ultimately,
seeks to find the origin of the fascist’s desire to kill. I will here attempt to plug the incel into this
framework of toxic masculinity, these words said in utmost seriousness, rather than the banalized
use of the term today; for the masculinity of the protofascist was something acrid that spread and
corroded everything surrounding it, attempting to nuke any presence of femininity, and, upon
final analysis, sexuality itself. Usually, man’s desire to kill is seen as a type of sexual
sublimation; some urge is repressed and violence provides them with their release. However,
Theweleit goes further. He finds that the fascist fantasy “springs from a dread that (perhaps) lies
in the hearts of all men, a dread of engulfment by the ‘other,’ which is the mother, the sea, or
even the moist embrace of love.”64 It isn’t that fascist sexuality gets its release in violence.
Instead, violence is carried out precisely against femininity, sexuality, and ‘all that flows.’ These
men fear free-flowing desire as it corrupts the order they care so deeply about. Annihilating all
that is messy and dirty around them is a means to strengthen their own ego’s boundaries, to
remain unexposed to Otherness. Sexual desire here constitutes an invasion, an attack on this
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clean ego by a foreign intruder. And thus in fascism, foreigners, and all that was thought to
represent this negativity and disorder came to represent a target for them, a way to return
fire against the desire that they would experience as pain.
The way Theweleit sees this coming to be is through the creation of body armor,
occurring at a moment where “men themselves were now split into a female (interior) and a
(male) exterior—the body armor. And as we know, the interior and exterior were mortal
enemies.”65 This occurred through various cultural conventions put in place over a long period of
time, used to secure power, that were part of a two-fold process in which men and women were
placed against each other, and the ego’s boundaries developed into something partitioned off.
The mind took priority and power over the body, representing rationality and control while the
body represented the irrationality of desire, an element that refuses subjugation. This ego and its
armor came to form in exact opposition to sexuality and all that revolts against control. The body
armor is the protection against this. Beneath it, the female interior represents the unconscious,
and all the desires that seek to express themselves. The armor, occurring at the level of
consciousness, blocks this, it fears the expression of such desires as they threaten its boundaries,
seeking to overflow it. In the external world, past this armor, the man is greeted with various
reminders of desire that flows: of the femininity they fear, of an Otherness in the sense it refuses
conscious control, to ever fully disclose itself. As a result, they attempt to annihilate it to affirm
themselves further. This places these men at an impasse: desire wishes to flow, but flowing
would threaten their ego boundaries, it threatens their entire being. Fascism offered an escape
from this. Theweleit, looking at the ritual marches of the fascist, said that in them was a theater
that portrayed:
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the armor’s separation from, and superiority over the interior: the interior was allowed to
flow, but only within the masculine boundaries of the mass formations. Before any of this
could happen, the body had to be split apart thoroughly enough to create an interior and
exterior that could be opposed to each other as enemies…What fascism promised men
was the reintegration of their hostile components under tolerable conditions, dominance
of the hostile ‘female’ element within themselves. 66
So fascism offered the ultimate way for men to both subjugate that within them that threatened
dissolution, while also allowing it to remain under control. In their marches, they were given
both a release and the continuation of control. They want their interior and exterior to merge, as
occurs in love, but this would simultaneously mean a violation of their boundaries. As a result,
their only points of access to such a unity was an ersatz replacement in violent showings of
power:
The nearest thing this man will enjoy to the Utopian encounter of the lover and beloved is
at the same time the most distant from it: a collision between the "unbending wills of two
peoples" embodied in two men in armed confrontation. They meet to kill; and the only
one to "flow" is the man who dies. The holes bored in his body are a signal of the
murderer's own transcendence of self. His self dissipates as he melts into the blood of a
man of his own kind.67
Theweleit notes here that it is crucial the enemy is a man like the soldier. Anyone who isn’t like
them represents only a miasma, a threat that would dirty their self that must remain clean. This
doesn’t offer transcendence, but only maintenance of the self’s borders. Through murder of an
enemy that is like them, they are able through this identification to transcend their self, if reliant
on such a narcissistic identification. The act of murder carries out an extreme ‘coupling’ of their
interior will and body with their conscious mind. The intensity of their act allows them to reach a
state of unity, albeit a unity between them and that which they reject: their body in all its
sensuality, all its Otherness. The cost, however, is the elimination, rather than connection, with
an external Other, who must instead be the sacrifice through which the soldier gains their
momentary unification. The intensity of this state appears to enact Bataille’s communication, a

66
67

Ibid.
Male Fantasies Volume 2, 276.

87

reaching toward a beyond, and certainly a risking of annihilation. However, as spoken at the
beginning of the quote, this is a faulty communication resulting from a narcissistic identification.
It certainly does not will defilement, for it is a standoff between two complete individuals, two
boundaries, situated in a context of survival and necessity, and without pleasure: “His ecstasy
takes the form of "blackout": perception of an end to the torment of existence as a man for whom
some form of coupling is indispensable, yet who never experiences the flowing of pleasure.”68
Though such a state is toward the beyond, it is unsatisfying. For as seen in Hegel’s life-death
struggle prior to the Lord-Bondsman dialectic, the victor who kills their Other fails to gain
anything more than a fleeting affirmation of their own existence, “the two do not mutually give
and receive one another back from each other through consciousness; they let one another go
quite indifferently, like things.” There is no exchange here, negativity is not held tight as
something to be embraced, but as a momentary obstacle to face in maintaining one’s existence.
The possibility of negation in the form of death present in the struggle is thus eliminated with the
victory of one over the Other, and without it, there is no opportunity for a more permanent
recognition of freedom. The exchange occurs under the domain of necessity.
It’s for this reason that the soldier relies on a continuation of such exchanges to sustain
themself: “If men fail in their strenuous efforts to transcend themselves and achieve
self-coupling, they revert ultimately to states of devouring symbioses: when they fail to "shake
off" the man they have once been, self-disgust triumphs.”69 Theweleit then discusses alcohol as a
means to reach this devouring symbiosis. Once cut off from the fleeting interaction with
negativity resulting from besting the Other, producing a transcendent state, the soldier chooses a
symbiosis that likewise offers a fleeting dissolution also lacking in Otherness. It is necessary for
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such a state to be desired in the soldier, or else he wouldn’t be able to carry out his war against
sexuality. Such a state of dissolution is important for understanding how the soldier can go on
functioning, fulfilling in violent bursts the desire for continuity, but never can it be enough, never
can it achieve a deeper permanence. This momentary dissolution is not Bataille’s moral summit,
on which negativity is embraced as risk, but rather something akin to a summit of survival: the
closest thing to the beyond one reaches without truly confronting the Other, an ersatz excess of
life that fundamentally fails as a project. Inevitably the soldier needs such states to go on, but this
always creates the need for another Other with which to attain their solitary, illusory unification.
It is carried out precisely to reaffirm his boundaries, to repel negativity. The death drive is
invoked, a height of inordinate tension carrying him towards what he believes to finally be
jouissance, but it is only partial. It operates under the domination of the pleasure principle,
tension is raised precisely to eliminate it and return to the pleasurable security of homeostasis:
“The blood of his victims must be made to flow free; how can they know that he rediscovers his
boundaries only as a killer wading in blood?”70 Risk occurs only to sustain stasis. The death
drive is subjugated, operating precisely in the name of maintaining order, providing a false
mastery over Otherness that cannot last.
The question is, do the same mechanisms operate in the incel shooter as in the fascist
soldier? Two objections must first be made that clearly differentiate the two. The first being that
the incel is part of no mass, but completely isolated. Though incel ideology and the social bonds
they form over the internet contest this isolation, their bonds are premised on a fundamental
isolation, maybe they may share their experiences at this, but never do they get lost in a mass.
The second important difference is that the incel’s violence is always that of a murder-suicide. It
is clear that ultimately, the incel seeks a complete and permanent annihilation, rather than any
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defense, any care for survival. This is no Hegelian life-death struggle, for the Other is eliminated
only for the self to later follow in this death. The similarities seem to be operative in the presence
of a fear of femininity, sexuality, and desire. As well as the pressure of a body armor that
contains a pressure between the internal world, the external world, and the layer of conscious ego
separating both. And ultimately, a desire to kill similar to the soldier’s. However, the difference
is that this unity becomes permanent: the incel commits suicide at their peak moment of
intensity. Here, one arrives at the logic found in the work of Marquis de Sade:
If we start from the principle of denying others posited by de Sade it is strange to observe
that at the very peak of unlimited denial of others is a denial of oneself. Theoretically,
denial of others should be affirmation of oneself, but it is soon obvious that if it is
unlimited and pushed as far as it can possibly go, beyond personal enjoyment, it becomes
a quest for inflexible sovereignty…Real sovereignty is not what it claims to be; it is never
more than an effort aimed at freeing human existence from the bonds of necessity.71
The incel’s suicide following their death may be explained by this logic. Their denial of others
ultimately reaches to the point they deny themselves. This sovereignty is not to be lauded—one
certainly wouldn’t in de Sade—but I do uphold that the incel’s violence does go far beyond the
bonds of necessity. Suicide is never bound by necessity. The Otherness that haunts them
externally is just as present internally and is viewed as something to be eliminated. It is this that
Baudrillard points out regarding the terrorist. Their relation to others and themselves constitute a
short-circuit in our system. George Sodini, logging the build-up to his exit plans, writes that he is
“Getting to think that a woman now would just, uh, get in the way of things.” He hesitates. Even
records the ‘uh.’ That statement single-handedly asks the question: what then is the point of his
attack? Even in himself, there is no ostensible paranoid logic present. It simply is an irrational
thing he feels he must do, against his own will and desire: constantly he folds, finding himself
not up for the task. In his fear of all that flows, he feels an unimaginable pressure to get rid of the
negativity he is unwilling to face. Every incel after Sodini begins to write some type of trail: it is
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known they are part of the ‘incel community,’ they leave some manifesto showing that their
actions are a revolt. But, assuming that Sodini wouldn’t have held a day-to-day blog with no
such allusions yet kept such a document in his bag, it appears he lacks this. There is no message
behind it. He doesn’t speak hatefully, instead his masculine desire seems to so deeply fear all that
is Other that he attempts to quell it all for good. This isn’t to make him appear better, but to show
that such insidious violence instead may present itself in what is considered to be a more passive
form. He seeks continuity but fears all negativity far too much to risk anything in an attempt to
achieve it. The most famous incel, Elliot Rodgers discusses his desire for a world without
sexuality, without women. This is the epitome of the fascist fantasy located by Theweleit, and
though his suicide remains an outlier under such a line of thinking, it holds a paranoid reasoning
behind it. However, in 2007, shortly after George Sodini typed the words: ‘Death Lives!’ he
carried out an act of violence without even articulating such an urge as a cause, driven to it
inexplicably by his sexual frustration. His fear of Otherness was not even felt as hate, but still
contained this desexualized mentality capable of producing violence. His reasonless act of
violence was an internal contradiction of the system expressing itself: without negativity, without
the Other, life and eroticism dies. In this void, death lives. Theweleit unearths this
desexualization and fear of Otherness in the fascist man, an ultimately masculine urge. It now
appears that such a view and project is being carried out at a much larger scale. That men would
be the violent actors carrying this out at its most radical points only makes sense, but the
connection here seems to be that the fascist male’s fear of Otherness is now occurring at a much
larger scale across our sexual practices. That to an extent, such a sterilized, fearful masculinity
has grown widespread under the guise of a sexual liberation: the contradiction here is that with
the greater openness to sex, sex has grown banal and been flattened, that the project of
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desexualization succeeds. The ostensible freedom of a sex without negativity has gotten rid of
the very negativity that constitutes the condition of freedom. Only in all that re-inserts negativity
into the process, rather than avoiding it, does the opportunity for eroticism exist.

The Violent Truth of Rationalization
It appears that the basic formula of the incel relies upon a mechanism similar to that
identified by Theweleit in his analysis of fascist fantasy: a man who fears sexuality and
femininity, as it threatens him with dissolution, a weakening of the body armor. As shown
throughout this analysis, our society today is predicated upon strict borders between egos: there
can be no Otherness, no negativity, for it would threaten these borders and thus stop the
narcissistic loop, allowing energy to leak out from the system, away from the self and to an
Other. Such an escape of energy, libido, desire, always goes against the laws of rational
functionality that dominate today: things are maintained through a massive amount of investment
in the self who fears any tension, any of the negativity required to attain self-recognition. In this
sense, we have become the lords of Hegel’s dialectic in spite of our bondage. The narcissistic
loop, which flees from Otherness, creates a more docile subject from which to extract from. This
is the logic found in Theweleit’s analysis of the creation of lack in the relations between man and
women, a historicized account of Lacan’s aphorism ‘There is no sexual relation.’ While these
two would seem to contradict for this reason, one posited as a result of historical processes, and
the other as a fundamental gap, the way to glue the two together is by admitting that this
fundamental contradiction will always be present, but the form through which it is reconciled
and bridged throughout history will change. In Theweleit’s analysis, he looks at the creation of
an eroticized wealthy woman in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who was posited as
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unattainable for poorer men. The result of this was that a low-born man was taught to desire a
love object that they were simultaneously excluded from interacting with. The eroticization of
the wealthy sublime women came at the expense of women of his own class. It was able to
generate misogyny through this resentment, as the lower class women were placed in the
position of ‘never enough,’ and effectively desexualized and debased. At the same time, the men
were placed under domination through creating a lack in their desire that they had to find other
ways to fill in (work, production). It would make sense that in the incel, this process is
heightened to the extreme through the production of an unattainable love object:
The commoner will never experience that pleasure, since SHE will never be attainable. In
other words, the closer the high-born woman comes by displaying her enticements to the
man of lower position, the more the sight of her makes him feel his social castration as a
sexual castration: his prick is too short, he can’t get it up high enough. By means of this
highly effective mechanism, his relationship with any real woman can be ruined, since
she can never measure up to, and will always be a poor substitute for, dreams of pleasure
associated with the image of the high-born woman. In his own mind he can never
measure up either, since castration tends to be total (relative castration is no easy matter).
He is then likely to develop an extreme form of penis envy with respect to the only
phallus that can ‘measure up’: the phallus of his master.72
This castration seems to be necessary for the creation of the incel. The world that feel rejected
from is the sex-having world. Note that this is not a literal castration, but rather the feeling of
lacking the phallus. For Lacan, the phallus is not the penis, but that which signifies lack,
something missing that if obtained, promises to ‘fill in’ the subject and give them a sense of
completeness. Obtaining it however, is impossible. This phallus ends up signifying one’s status
in the social order. So when the incel, as with the commoner in the eighteenth century, feels
sexually castrated, it is a misperceived result of his position in the social order. In some way or
form, he is missing something, he lacks power and is ultimately dominated. However, through
the eroticized image of the sublime women, this social castration is felt as a sexual castration: the
social status that ensures a subjugated life ends up meaning to the man that he is lacking
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something sexually, due to the fact it ensures he can never reach his sublime erotic object. It is
obvious in the incel that, given their isolation, lack of friends or satisfying lives, they are
intensely socially castrated. Their lives are depressing, owing to this position. But, because of the
idea of an unattainable erotic object, this position isn’t felt as a social one, instead presenting
itself as sexual. It isn’t that they feel excluded from society at large, but from an imagined
‘sex-having society.’ Only for this reason would hiring a prostitute not be the solution for them:
it isn’t so much about the act of sex itself, but from lacking the imagined social capital necessary
to have sex. And if it seems like this is arguing that such social capital is real, that their celibacy
truly is ‘involuntary,’ then it is at such a point I arrive at the fact that they have, at an
unconscious level, chosen to preclude themselves from such a world. Of course, the incel doesn’t
experience any sexual partner as being ‘not enough,’ but in the context of today’s
desexualization, so far away has the sublime desired woman risen at the expense of all others,
that no woman probably feels good enough to them. They lack the necessary social capital not to
simply have sex, but to have the sex they feel they deserve, which might not even exist. For most
incels likely could have sex if they didn’t identify so deeply with a stance that eliminates it as a
possibility both through pessimism and the misogynist disdain it brings with it. Though even
here things are suspicious: a lot of misogynists have sex. Incels seem to instead not even desire
it.73 And it is in this rejection of sexuality that the analysis of Theweleit comes into play. For why

Certain sub-communities within incel circles are excluded for inhabiting the social exterior: extreme mental
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the argument used against incels that sex is not a fundamental right seems to work wonkily, for the socially abjected
are left to deal with the cruel hand they’ve been dealt. Regardless of whether anyone ‘deserves sex,’ should certain
people simply accept that their existence is one precluded from intimacy? While there is no space for an in-depth
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else would Elliot Rodgers, who acted because of sexual frustration, fantasize not about sex for
all, sex for him even, but instead envision an ideal world where:
future generations of men would be oblivious to these remaining women’s existence, and
that is for the best. If a man grows up without knowing of the existence of women, there
will be no desire for sex. Sexuality will completely cease to exist. Love will cease to
exist. There will no longer be any imprint of such concepts in the human psyche. It is the
only way to purify the world.74
In order to have such a fantasy, it is obvious that a real inability to find sexual partners is not
what is at issue. At a fundamental level in the incel, the ones who commit violence at least: they
must not even want to have sex. They are repulsed by it, they fear it, and their acts ensure that
they will never have it. The desexualization of the world, the cleansing of negativity and, with
this, eroticism, ensures that sexual stimulation itself appears as too much of a risk: for it might
bring with it some degree of Otherness. So far desexualized is the incel, so repressed is their
desire, that even the slightest appearance of sexual urges threatens complete dissolution, means
annihilation. Women themselves represent a radical Otherness for the incel that horrifies them.
This is the same logic as Theweleit’s fascist, who fears woman and sexuality because they
constitute a negativity that threatens the masculine order.
For Rodgers here, a world without women represents a utopian world with no Otherness:
perfectly sterile. This is why, of course, Elliot Rodgers envisions such a world as the only way
toward ‘purification’, for this is about cleansing all dirt and uncertainty, all sexuality, love, and
intimacy: anything that threatens the borders of the individual is too excessive and must be done
away with. The result is the pure progress of an imagined teleological force, which Rodgers
believes would lead “the human race to a state of perfect civilization.” Is this not a repetition of
Sodini’s slip that “a woman now would just, uh, get in the way of things.”? In spite of the incel’s
desexualized view, in which they desire to not desire sex, their social castration is present, with
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them inhabiting a position of exclusion (resulting from their inability to face any negativity
leading them to isolation and extreme beliefs) that still appears to them as a sexual one, due to
the inability to expunge such bodily urges in spite of their ideological opposition to them. Having
sex would allow them to enter into the social order they feel excluded from, but having sex is no
an option for them due to their fear of it.
Rodgers admits the impossibility of his fantasy (and latent here, does he not also admit
that he himself will never be able to fully rid of sexuality?), and presents an inversion of the
aforementioned logic:
Such a thing will never become a reality for me, but it did give me something to fantasize
about as I burned with hatred towards all women for rejecting me throughout the years.
This whole viewpoint and ideology of abolishing sex stems from being deprived of it all
my life. If I cannot have it, I will do everything I can to DESTROY IT. 75
That his fantasy throughout his supposed ‘rejections’ ( he doesn’t even try through his
hundred-forty page autobiography) wouldn’t be finally having sex, but eliminating it completely,
seems to confirm this point. His fundamental fantasy was precisely to destroy sexuality, for it
represents the Otherness and negativity he so deeply feared. Destroying it could only mean an
annihilation of his surroundings, and, at that final moment, his own self, for only then could the
sexual urges be gotten rid of, constituting an elimination of all Otherness. For a man who fears
and despises Otherness to such a degree, the violence enacted must end with suicide: even the
Otherness within him must be destroyed.
Only in the extremity of this double bind does the suicidal aspect of the incel reveal itself.
An outer annihilation will only upkeep his borders for so long: the ultimate pressure is just as
much internal, a sexual desire that presents itself as an outside intruder. Maybe here the
aforementioned violent encounter found in Theweleit comes into play. In the physical extreme of
utter destruction, the incel’s body armor finally fuses. He attains his fleeting affirmation of the
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self, and is able to achieve unity. However, this moment can only last for so long. Very soon the
pressure of sexual desire will return, necessitating it as the last target on his list, the last source of
uncertainty and negativity. With the annihilation of himself, in the heat of this moment, he is able
to both escape any encounter with the Other, permanently, while also attempting to reach the
beyond, via death. The extremity of the incel’s situation is one in which any erotic encounter
horrifies: still, it is only natural in the body to reach toward this excess of life that comes from
negativity. For long periods, what the incel doesn’t risk returns as utter pressure upon him.
Eventually, however, this human need for transcendence attempts to find expression. The only
venue left is destruction: of the self and Others. A complete sacrifice resulting from a build-up.
The matrices of our system brim over in these coordinates, and the desexualization that ensures
the continued rule of rational productivity ends up backfiring. It appears arbitrary, the contingent
act of a crazy individual. Certainly not a deeper problem beyond access to mental health, gun
control laws, etc. But the truth of the matter is that they are a product of the widespread process
of cleansing negativity, purifying against risk. Theweleit’s fascistic project comes to fruition
here. The death drive’s attempts to subvert order are pushed down upon, and the result is a
violent short-circuit. This move to get rid of negativity is precisely what causes such destruction.
In the aftermath, politics and the media attempt to process this breakdown, but can only do it by
chalking such violence up to exception, ensuring that the negativity within such acts that might
allow us to understand their deeper meaning is washed away. As a result, these symptoms aren’t
ever read as pointing toward a deeper pathology. These readings continue the process of
purification that causes them, as they make such outbursts represent the terrifying negativity of
chance, providing further reason for us to take fewer risks and sacrifice life’s excesses in the
name of security.
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Postscript
Faced with the end of all of this writing, I know I’ve failed. I see now that I’m a
hypocrite. I fail to live by the principles I advocate for, I try to risk but am too trapped in an
overwhelming impulse towards self-control. I have too much fear and doubt. The work itself, for
all it might achieve (and I am unsure that it has even achieved much), has not gotten where I’d
like it to. At moments, it falls into being a surface-level statement of platitudes regarding my
generation’s primary sexual phenomena. I alternate between advocating for a hedonism in which
one should live recklessly, against considerations for safety, and in other moments for a
conservatism in which pleasure must always be worked for—implying that a pleasure without
pain will always lead us astray. It is not clear that either works as a be-all-end-all solution for
how we should live, or even view such phenomena. Everything needs to be looked at further, but
at times, it already feels like I’ve subjected my reader to an embarrassing and excessive amount
of words discussing this obscene subject matter. For even in the most detached moments I have
left intimate traces of myself, offering up myself vulnerably to the disgust of others, to a wide
range of conclusions to be made about the type of person who attempts to write about these
topics, who seems a little too interested in them, and may even carry out an analysis without the
necessary philosophical precision: thus coming off as just really really wanting to do the
‘research’ and talk about all this, but maybe with perverse motivations. And this isn’t to mention
the fear that at moments, I might have crossed a line. In such imagined or real moments, the
lifeless masculine totalizing desire that I polemicize against leaks out, comes out, in wretched
form. I can’t know which of these feared reactions are on the dot. Or what at first might have
slipped by, but after my neurotic enunciation, now is revealed, changing the tone of my work. I
was so close too… This is all, I hope understandably, horrifying to me. I mean come on, my
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parents will read this.76 My friends will too.77 It’s been bad enough having to explain what I’m
writing about to those who ask only out of small talk: none of the reactions have been that bad,
but I can imagine where the mind goes and only try to ignore what I haven’t picked up on.
Luckily, even with all these fears, I’m left in a win-win scenario. As more than anywhere
else, it’s in the moments of this work that say a bit too much about me, rather than the subject at
hand, where I enact the deeper communication I praise, where I might leave you, dearest reader,
with knowledge about a part of me I myself don’t even know about. Only in such instances can I
hope that this work transgresses my internal principle toward self-control. Only here can I hope
that the risks have paid off and I’ve communicated to you at an intimate level. If something
off-putting about me came up, say, in the discussion of incels that has only just been brought to a
close, I’d like to think it constitutes an attempt at honesty. I’m trying specifically not to be the
white guy writing a book about incels that has ‘White Masculine Victimhood’ in the title: we are
never so far removed from those we consider evil. We can’t simply pat ourselves on the back and
think that they are of a completely different ilk: we all fear negativity in its various
manifestations and cling to the security of order against the entropic productions of the death
drive. We all, at varying degrees, are complicit in certain ways of thinking that do create
violence, and confronting this is not easy. There is a likely horrifying Other in all of us and it is
too easy to pretend it isn’t there.
So, in spite of my inability to risk as I’d like to, in spite of all the fears and doubts present
in writing and showing this to anyone, I’m going to be a little lazy, enjoy myself, and say that all
these mess-ups and gaps and reaction-provoking breaks are proof that this risk thing is actually
the way to go, that such failures are the basis of intimacy, no matter how ugly. I made a point to

76
77

If I let them.
Ibid.

100

say that we should affirm all outcomes, and if it didn’t work out, well, I warned you. Though
hopefully, if chance was in my favor, this all paid off and allowed me to go further than if I had
played it safe, creating the space for rethinking and new thinking in you, my reader.
Now that I’ve gotten that out of my system, providing myself with what I’d like to think
of as a little line of defense for myself and emphasis on the overall theme, I’ll recount where we
have gone through in this digression-filled argument. Bataille offers us with the beautiful
recognition that in order to truly live, we need to be willing to take the greatest of risks. Such a
level of risk affirms all outcomes, even those in which we suffer annihilation. Only with such an
extreme approach, embracing negativity and chance, do we access life’s greatest joys, and leave
the isolated shell of the self to truly reach an Other. In fact, we later find that Deleuze’s
conception of the eternal return is also a force of affirming negativity, that he also views such an
affirmation as requiring that one embraces chance beyond the limits of what is believed to be
possible, beyond any imposition of limits, and that only here does the human play. Everything
else is a losing game. For Deleuze, play is governed by the death drive precisely because this
ability to introduce the different and the negative is the means through which life manifests itself
as an excess, as opposed to a continuation of the same. The death drive is a force that increases
tension in a system, and only through this does life transcend routine. Bataille’s risk provides the
template for properly playing such a game, where one may be rewarded with life at its most
excessive; eroticism, the affirmation of life up to the limit of death. It also provides a ground for
ethics, in its willingness to face negativity, and even go so far as to will evil. Though at first it
might appear that Bataille is being transgressive for transgression’s sake, overly seduced by
extreme behavior, Derrida’s gift of death is placed in connection to such an attitude. Derrida
shows that the ultimate truth of morality is its latent immorality. A responsible act always brings
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with it irresponsibility, one can never ultimately justify or account for their actions. The ethical
duty towards an Other always comes at the cost of another Other. Bataille’s will toward evil, his
pact that ‘while some live, others die,’ ultimately accounts for this gift of death. As a result, the
risk he advocates for goes so far as to take into account the effects of one actions that usually
remain conveniently ignored: the evilness it brings with it, the gift of death that is given to
another Other in the name of the Other to whom one is bound. This constitutes a true embrace of
negativity and death in Bataille that allows us to build an ethics of risk out of his thinking.
Eroticism, constituting a state that both recognizes the Other intimately and affirms life, is taken
to be a peak state of such thinking.
This is all in contrast to where Baudrillard places our current society, stating that death
has been repressed, reducing life to solely survival without excess—a bare life. This is the
domain of Nietzsche’s last man, whose passive nihilism clings to comfort and security, flees
from all sources of pain, in an attempt to remain healthy. The repercussions are that such a life
lacks precisely that which takes life beyond routine and function. One lives, but without any
meaning, any real purpose beyond continuing life. For Baudrillard, this attempt to remove death
from our lives causes us to proceed under a principle of rationality, leaving us with a society that
institutes safety wherever possible, while continuing to permit murder and violence whenever
economically beneficial. We certainly repress the gift of death in such a society. Only that which
has a function is permitted, anything that is excessive or arbitrary (and here life is precisely at its
fullest) is eliminated or at least hidden. Baudrillard then puts forth that with such a societal fear
of death, sexuality also loses its luster. Here, Bataillian eroticism, the pinnacle of excessive life,
gives way to a sexuality that is only permitted if it has a function. This allows the sexual
liberation to, in spite of its lifting of prohibitions, constitute a more dead sex. The taboos are
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mostly gone, but all that is allowed proceeds off of a rationale in which it lacks negativity and
with this, excess. From here, I begin an analysis of concrete sexual practices that have only
recently come into being. The logic behind this analysis is that if eroticism, life at its most
excessive and willing to embrace negativity, has recently further lost this excessive and negative
quality, then life itself has begun to grow incredibly dead. A dead eroticism implies a widespread
narcissism and lack of ability to embrace the Other. It implies an extreme inability to face the
negative and risk, for love is the ultimate irrational reason that one takes risks and now even in
love, rationality becomes the emphasis.
The sex we have alone, masturbation, is today completely defined by porn. Pornography
means sexual stimulation without any negativity, anything lacking. By removing this veiled
aspect of sexuality, it disintegrates. Where sex was, porn now is. It is sexuality as a pure
function: it cuts to the chase and ostensibly brings with it no baggage: it does all the work for
you. Masturbation, once reliant on imagination, today completely receives its fantasmic object
from the internet’s vast supply of pornography. It teaches one to desire sex without any of its
negativity. Such a ‘pornographic desire’ goes on to replace sexuality, ensuring later on, that even
sex with another person is reduced to a narcissistic act. For those who watch porn, compulsively
or not, it appears to have created a widespread feeling of guilt, despite society no longer viewing
masturbation, or porn necessarily, as shameful or immoral. Through pornography’s lack of
negativity, one ends up feeling a sense of indebtedness, a counter-movement to its free pleasure.
Such an indebtedness is related to Nietzsche’s concept of guilt/bad conscience. Also, the
appearance of guilt seems to follow Lacan’s statement that ‘The only thing one can feel guilty of
is having given ground to one’s desire.’ For it appears here that in watching porn, the viewer
often has given into their superego’s imperative to enjoy. The superego is never satisfied, so one
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masturbates increasingly compulsively without feeling satisfied. In such a process, one is not
acting upon what they truly desire, but being led astray by the superego. Guilt arises from the
sense one isn’t acting in accordance with their deeper desires, but instead submitting to the
demands of a superego that seeks an enjoyment that never satisfies it. If porn is sex without
negativity, the attempt to remove these negative aspects carries out its destructive results in the
sense of guilt and emptiness that arise from a pleasure that always comes at a cost.
The mindless state of the extremely compulsive masturbator seemingly might present
itself as subversive, not to mention as a state akin to Bataille’s dissolution of the ego achieved in
eroticism and death. But ultimately, this takes us to a discussion of the death drive, which
traditionally conceived, appears to be present in such a state, in that it reaches toward the
Nirvana principle, where Marcuse theorizes death drive’s utopian aspect: a lowering of all
tension. Upon final analysis, such an approach to life and such a conception of the death drive
fails in subverting things: it is instead the most extreme maintenance of the status quo. The
masturbator’s narcissistic pleasure produces vast amounts of money for porn companies, and is
unable to attain a deeper satisfaction due to its lack of negativity. Even if tension is raised
through the lengths of the sessions, it eventually grows flat, and oscillation is to be avoided.
Theoretically, the death drive’s as a return to an inorganic state, as a lowering of tension, is found
to be identical to the pleasure principle. It fails to account for the death drive’s productive aspect
emphasized in Lacan, Deleuze, and Zupancic. Here, the death drive raises tension and introduces
negativity and difference, for how else could one account for any ability for life to go on under
extreme circumstances? The death drive is praised for this subversive aspect, and Nick Land’s
theory that fascism comes precisely as an attempt to subjugate the death drive is taken up. Here, I
make sure to turn Land against himself, for he eventually became an alt-right figurehead. It
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appears that his conception of death drive, and his praise for it, eventually became its own force
of rationalization, of instituting sameness. To be avoided is such a mythology of the death drive,
that any teleology can be ascribed to it as a force taking us to a utopia: this thinking betrays the
drive’s subversive force, precisely in instituting negativity, in creating contingent moments that
move us beyond what we thought was possible.
After this diversion to the domain of the death drive, to continue to justify the embrace of
negativity and point to what results from a failure to do so, I return to the societal presence of a
pornographic desire. Now, in sex with others, the principle of sex as pure biological release,
lacking in lack and Otherness, has caused sex with Others to become akin to masturbation, to
become a more narcissistic endeavor out of its inability to risk. This is exemplified in dating
apps, consent culture, bodily-prosthetics, and sex dolls. In dating apps, from finding casual sex
partners to finding lovers, interactions are dominated by conscious choice and optimizing such a
choice, rather than the contingent, unconscious character that seems crucial to love, and even to a
healthier hook-up culture. One is presented with an idealized version of another person, a
personal advertisement for the self as a commodity, and the resulting encounters grow
increasingly formulaic. By removing the role of chance in such interactions, by creating partners
from casual to serious in a manner devoid of the traditional uncertainty, such relationships lose
their excessive and arbitrary character. They instead become a functional exchange of pleasure,
and one is nearly able to decide on a whim whether or not they want to have sex or find love, as
if it was a task with no additional weight. It grows similar to ordering an Uber or liking a photo
on instagram. One is able to have sex and love with none of the pain or failure—making it all
incredibly unfulfilling, and love here lacks the contingency and unconscious desire that defines
it.
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In consent culture, the rigidification and formalization of courting seen in dating apps
become a principle of policing. Consent culture is given its due as a necessary response to a real
presence of violence, to a culture of rape and victim denial/shaming. However, its form is placed
as a trend in an overall movement seen in dating apps as well. Sexual encounters, which are by
no means black and white affairs governed by exact lines, are considered consensual or not based
upon rigid classifications. Verbal cues are emphasized. The dilemma here is that desire is made
to follow rules and a language in which it fails to be fully expressed. If one must always speak in
order to act in sex, then it becomes devoid of any veil. Both parties need to know what they
want, to be able to ask for what they want, and to still get aroused from being asked or asking
such questions. Being able to identify with certainty what does and doesn’t cross a line is an
impossibility when language doesn’t tell the whole story, yet is simultaneously presented as
being the only bridge from one to another. Ultimately, following to a tee the codes of consent
precludes Bataille’s erotic state: individuals are put forth as complete, without any lack, and thus
unable to dissolve the boundaries of the ego required to meet the Other. Bataillean risk is
certainly not invoked here with the goal of promoting an acceptance of non-consensual sex, but
rather to show that between a sexual being’s enunciations and desires lies a gap that contains a
negativity unable to be bridged by language. Between two lovers who are willing to be
vulnerable with each other, and who contain no intention to harm each other, one can imagine
that following any formula ensures that their existences remain closed. That sex becomes a
transactional exchange in which two willing parties offer to their partners solely the pleasures
accessible by conscious awareness, devoid of a deeper unconscious desire.
In the bodily prosthetics of models, the sublime woman is put forth as a human body
without any signifiers of negativity. Any imperfections are corrected by surgery, regimes of skin
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care, exercise, photo-shop, and diet. The body itself becomes abjected, a source of negativity too
much to bear. Instead, desire is taught to desire an idealized immaterial figure. The sexually
desired object is so perfect as to lose any veil, any aspect, that doesn’t function to signify sexual
arousal. The result is that the bodies of those who haven’t followed such regimes appear
desexualized and debased: arousal is reserved for an other who brings with her no signs of
Otherness, of difference, thus constituting a pure narcissistic ideal. In sex-dolls, a similar logic
prevails: one desires sex with an other-thing that lacks any Otherness. For both, one desired
sexual object turns into sterilized sexual stimulation. Across the board, pornographic desire
prevails as sex with others becomes increasingly premised upon an individual’s narcissistic
pleasure, precluded from passing to a state beyond the ego.
After arguing that sex today is being expunged of negativity, turning it into a narcissistic
pornographic pleasure whether one masturbates, has tons of one-night stands, or in a
monogamous relationship, the result is an emphatically dying eroticism. A sexuality replaced by
pornography. If it appears this negativity is worth such a sacrifice in exchange for the ease of
which pleasure is attained—even if it creates guilt, a sense of emptiness, kills love, causes
narcissism, etc—then in the appearance of incel violence, the process of desexualization speaks
its ugly truth. Here, the relationship between sex and death and the pathologies of our current
sexual practices are presented in a radically horrifying microcosm. As incels are a recent
phenomenon, I find that they result, and extend, precisely the logic seen throughout my analysis.
The violent incel is the most extreme manifestation of the tendency to eliminate Otherness and
negativity identified throughout. Contrary to their accounts, it seems the incel doesn’t even desire
sex, instead, they desire to eliminate all sexuality. Their frustration likely doesn’t come down to
an inability to satisfy their urges, to find sexual outlets in any form—but instead the fact that
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their willingness to remain sterile, without Otherness, contradicts with the fact their body still
desires sex. The frustration comes from this contradiction between their two desires, placing
them at an impasse. Ultimately, the need to remain untouched by Otherness wins over, leading
them to reject sexual desire, instead attempting to achieve dissolution through murder and death.
The violent incel is so fearful of sexuality and negativity that they annihilate their surroundings
in an attempt to purify things. In their murderous rampage, consummated by suicide, even the
Otherness with thim presents itsef as a threat to be eliminated, as bringing with it a sexual desire
that threatens them toward dissolving their borders. They do still achieve a dissolution, however,
it is only possible through death. While the incel’s violence appears distant from our everyday
life, I locate in the incel a principle of rationalized desexualization occurring in our society. By
avoiding risk in the name of safety, we not only sacrifice the greatest joys, but also fail even in
our attempt to expel death: for it always returns.
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